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THE FAILED GE/HONEYWELL MERGER:
THE RETURN OF PORTFOLIO-EFFECTS THEORY?
INTRODUCTION
Along with the increasing globalization of world markets, the con-
vergence of antitrust enforcement policy has become an important is-
sue to antitrust regulators, scholars, and international corporations.
The recent General Electric/Honeywell International merger proposal
illustrates that differences in enforcement philosophies between the
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and European Commis-
sion (EC or the Commission) can cause uncertainty in the area of
merger regulation and highlight the importance of harmonized anti-
trust policies in the world market.
On July 3, 2001, the Commission announced that it was blocking the
proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell Interna-
tional. 1 General Electric (GE) is a diversified corporation active in
several fields, including aircraft engines and financial services. 2
Within the airline industry, GE's focus is on the manufacturing of
large commercial and regional jet engines. Honeywell International
(Honeywell) is an advanced technology and manufacturing company
that produces small regional and corporate aircraft engines as well as
a range of aviation products known as avionics and non-avionics.3
Honeywell is a direct competitor of GE in the market for small re-
gional jet engines, but for the most part, Honeywell's products com-
1. EU Commission Bars Acquisition of Honeywell by General Electric, 81 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 2015, at 4 (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Bars Acquisition].
2. Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46), 1 3. available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf (last visited Jan.
31. 2003) [hereinafter GE/Honeywell]. GE is also active in appliances, information services.
power systems. lighting, industrial systems, medical systems, plastics, broadcasting, and transpor-
tation systems. It reported revenues of approximately $130 billion in 2000. GE, Honey'well
Merger is Cleared bv DOJ Pending Spin-Off of Helicopter Engine Sector. 80 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 432 (May 11. 2001) [hereinafter GE, Honeywell Merger Cleared]. For more
information on General Electric and its services, visit its website at http://www.ge.con.
3. EU Opens Full Investigation of General Electric, Honeywell Deal. 80 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1998, at 216-17 (Mar. 9, 2001) [hereinafter EU Opens Full Investigation].
See GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 9 230-235. Avionics products are the ranges of equipment
used to control the aircraft in such areas as navigation, communication, and assessing flying
conditions. Id. 9 231. Non-avionics products handle the operation of an aircraft [such as auxil-
iary power units, environmental control systems, electric power, wheels and brakes, landing gear.
and aircraft lighting.] Id. 91 234. Honeywell reported revenues of approximately $25 billion in
2000. GE. Honeywell Merger Cleared, supra note 2. at 432. For more information about Honey-
well International and its services, visit its website at http://www.honeywell.com.
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plement those sold by GE in the airline industry. The merger
agreement between the two corporations stated that Honeywell was
to become a wholly-owned subsidiary of GE.
The GE/Honeywell decision illustrates what American companies
had feared since the inception of merger regulation in the EC: it was
the first time that the EC blocked a merger between two American
companies after the merger was cleared by its home regulator.4 De-
spite the emerging presence of the European Union (EU) as a leader
in competition regulation in recent years, the EC's decision to block
the GE/Honeywell merger was unexpected. 5 With the growing inter-
national economy, this action by the EC is forcing more and more
American companies to take the European regulators seriously. 6 The
decision has created an unpredictable environment for companies as
well as investment bankers to obtain regulatory approval outside of
their home regulator.7 The decision also called attention to the need
to increase dialogue within the international antitrust community to
further re-evaluate whether merger regulation laws created at the na-
tional level continue to be effective in regulating the increasing
amount of international mergers taking place and whether they need
to create an international set of antitrust regulations, specifically for
merger control.8
4. Francesco Guerrera, GE and Honeywell Decision Challenged. FIN. TIMES (London), Sept.
13. 2001, at 23. The home regulator that cleared the merger was the Department of Justice
(DOJ). This is the second time that the EC has blocked a merger between two American com-
panies. However, the first merger it blocked between MCI/Worldcom and Sprint was also
blocked by the Department of Justice. See also Barry E. Hawk, The EEC Merger Regulation:
The First Step Toward One-Stop Merger Control, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 195, 210 (1990) (predicting
that the EC's "broad remedial powers under the Regulation may raise jurisdictional and comity
issues if the EC attempts to invoke them in transactions involving non-Community firms") (cit-
ing Sondra Roberto, The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger Review: A Serious Stretch of Euro-
pean Competition Powers, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 593. 593 (1998)).
5. Jean Eaglesham & Francesco Guerrera, Brussels Takes Tougher Line than US on Mergers,
Claims Research, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 2002. at 3. Cf. Francesco Guerrera & Guy de
Jonquieres. Unfair Competition: Mario Monti's Proposals to Modernise European Merger Regu-
lation are Already Viewed by Some Critics as a Missed Opportunity, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec.
11, 2001, at 16 (stating that past merger cases reviewed by the Commission have alerted compa-
nies to the long arm of the EU law, most notably the recent decision to block the GE/Honeywell
merger, especially after the DOJ cleared it).
6. Francesco Guerrera & Juliana Ratner. EU Decision Changes Attitudes: Companies and
Their Advisers Now Have to Take Into Account a Much Less Predictable European Regulatory
Dimension Before Starting to Set Up International Deals. FIN. TIMES (London). Sept. 13, 2001. at
3.
7. Id.
8. See generally Ilene Knale Goits & Phillip A. Proyer. Multijurisdictional Review: A Societal
Cost That Must be Streamlined. M & A LAWYER. Oct. 2001, at 7.
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Part II of this Note will discuss the emergence of the Commission's
competition laws and the recently enacted Merger Regulation. 9 Part
III will compare the EU's competition laws and policies with the
United States' antitrust laws.' 0 Special attention will be focused on
the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger, which highlights important
differences between the two powerhouse antitrust regulators." Part
IV will cover the analysis of the blocked merger between GE and
Honeywell, illustrate how the United States and EC came to differing
conclusions, and explain the possible reasoning for the divergent
views.12 Part V will discuss the effects of this decision, short and long
term, and whether there is a need for increased dialogue to jump-start
an international set of agreements for antitrust regulations, specifi-
cally for merger control.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
When the EU competition laws were formed, there was no mention
of merger guidelines at the Community level. To facilitate the grow-
ing need at the time the common market was nearly completed, the
courts attempted to interpret Articles 81 and 82 broadly to cover cer-
tain types of mergers. Finally, when it became clear that a more com-
prehensive approach was necessary, the EC adopted the Merger
Regulations in 1989.
A. Merger Regulation in the European Commission
The Treaty of Rome, which created the EC, contains two major pro-
visions dealing with competition policies: Articles 81 and 82.14 Article
81 states:
[Article 81] prohibits all agreements between undertakings, deci-
sions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which
9. See infra notes 14-91 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 92-120 and accompanying text.
11. The Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger was the closest that the EC came to blocking a
merger between two United States-based corporations after it had been cleared by either the
FTC or the DOJ. It was not until Boeing agreed to certain key concessions that the deal was
able to get EC clearance. Amy Ann Karpel, The European Commission's Decision on the Boe-
ing-McDonnell Douglas Merger and the Need for Greater U.S.-EU Cooperation in the Merger
Field, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1029, 1045-46 (1998).
12. See infra notes 121-261 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 262-330 and accompanying text.
14. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE To EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRAC-
TICE 2 (6th ed. 1997). The Treaty lays out the competition rules in Articles 81-90 (formerly
Articles 85-94). Articles 81 and 82 deal with the substantive antitrust rules, and Articles 83
through 85 deal with the procedural principles. REIN WESSELING. THE MODERNISATION OF EC
ANTITRUST LAW 16 (2000).
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may affect trade between Member States, and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market. 15
Article 82 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits "any abuse by one or more
undertakings with a dominant position within the Common Market,
or in a substantial part of it, as unlawful insofar as it may affect trade
between Member States."' 16 The language of Article 82 expressly fo-
cuses on "undertakings with a dominant position."' 7 A dominant po-
sition is defined by EU case law as "a position of economic strength
enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective com-
petition being maintained in the relevant market by affording it the
power to behave independently of its competitors, its customers and
ultimately of the consumers.""' This concept of a dominant position is
comparable to the United States' concept of market power. 19 Article
82 prohibits "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the common market, or in a substantial part of it, in so
far as it might affect trade between Member States."'20
During the drafting of the Treaty of Rome, there were no specific
provisions proposed for merger regulation. Although there was no
formal explanation for this, several arguments have been put forth to
account for that omission. One possibility was that merger regulation
was not considered vital at the time of the Treaty's drafting.21 At that
15. Treaty Establishing the European Community. 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992). [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992): see also Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Com-
petition Law. 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 55. 58 (1992). Article 81 was originally titled Article 85.
16. Waller. supra note 15, at 68. Article 82 was originally titled Article 86.
17. See id. (stating that "[a] dominant position is defined as the ability to act independently of
competitive forces"): see also Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission. 1978 E.C.R. 207; Case
85/76, Hoffman-LaRoche v. Commission. 1979 E.C.R. 461.
18. Hoffman. 1979 E.C.R. 461. See also William J. Kolasky. Conglomerate Mergers and
Range Effects: It's a Long Way From Chicago to Brussels, Address Before the George Mason
University Symposium (Nov. 9, 2001). at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9536.htm (last
visited Jan. 30. 2003).
19. Kolasky. supra note 18.
20. WESSELING. supra note 14. at 16. Abuse was later defined by the Court of Justice as:
an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position
which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and
which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition normal com-
petition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial opera-
tors. has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still
existing in the market or the growth of that competition.
Id. at 81. See Hoffman. 1979 E.C.R. at 541.
21. 3 ADVOKATERNE BREDGADE ET AL., MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC: A SURVEY OF
EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAWS 222 (1988) [hereinafter MERGER CONTROL IN TiE EEC]. In-
deed. at that time none of the Member States themselves had the power to regulate mergers, nor
found it important to have such provisions. Id.
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time, the European Economic Community (EEC) (as it was known at
that time before changing its name to the EC) was more concerned
with creating a common market than with restricting the concentra-
tion of corporations.22 To facilitate the creation of a common market,
the EEC felt it was essential for corporations to merge to create mar-
ket efficiencies.23 With each nation protecting its own industry, merg-
ing corporations within the same industry facilitated a movement
toward a unified common market. Thus, merger control was not a
major priority during the initial stages of the creation of the common
market because the EEC did not want to regulate what it felt was
necessary to achieve a common market. 24
Another reason why a merger regulation provision was not incorpo-
rated into the Treaty of Rome might have been the belief that merger
control was highly susceptible to politicization. 25 The Member States
were not willing to relinquish authority over merger control because
they wanted to protect their own markets. 26 This was a logical stance
for Member States to take, as the notion of a common market was
relatively new and no State was willing to relinquish power for the
sake of the Community. 27 Each nation was accustomed to protecting
its own interests, and the notion of a common borderless market was
daunting. Therefore, the power to regulate mergers remained in the
jurisdiction of each of the Member States.
With the growth of an international economy, the need for a Com-
munity-wide merger regulation grew. 28 It seemed contradictory to
have the goal of a single, harmonized market while at the same time
22. Id. at 222-23. See WESSELING. supra note 14. at 33. Starting in the early 1980s, the "sec-
ond generation" of EC competition law decisions emerged. The focus shifted away from creat-
ing a unified common market toward regulating processes in the market. Id.
23. See Alessandro Bertolini & Francesco Parisi, The Rise of Structuralism in European
Merger Control. 32 STAN. J. INT'L L. 13. 16 (1996) (stating the framers of the treaty viewed
mergers as a critical step toward the integration of Member State's economies).
24. Id. The desire to achieve a fully integrated, common market discounted the fear that
these mergers would create anticompetitive effects in the market. Id.
25. See Thomas P. O'Toole. " The Long Arin of the Law "-European Merger Regulation and
its Application to the Merger of Boeing & McDonnell Douglas, 11 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 203, 215-16
(1998).
26. See id. Indeed. looking at the Merger Regulation that was eventually adopted in 1989, it is
abundantly clear that major negotiations went on to satisfy both the EC and the Member States.
See WESSELINC. supra note 14. at 136.
27. See generally DERRICK WYATT & ALAN DASHwOOi), EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW 499
(3d ed. 1993) (illustrating that in order for all of the Member States to agree on a Community-
level merger regulation, there was a compromise that any merger that did not meet a specified
threshold determined in the Merger Regulation would then be reviewed by the individual Mem-
ber States).
28. See DORIS HILDEBRANDis. THE ROLE Ot EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS IN THE EC COMPETITION
RuL-s 83 (1998) (relating that Europe did not have an adequate system for reviewing mergers
2003] 1289
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tolerating widely diverging State laws regulating mergers. 29 It was re-
alized that in order to have a unified common market, it was vital to
have one set of merger regulations implemented at the Community
level. 30 Having to deal with the merger regulations of each Member
State in the Community would be a great expense of time and money,
and would create possible inconsistencies. A merger regulation at the
Community level would create a "one-stop shop" for merging compa-
nies because having to deal with only one authority would make the
process more efficient. 31 Thereafter in 1973, there was a push to cre-
ate a merger regulation for the EC.32 Needing unanimous approval
by the Member States, it was not well received and thus, was conse-
quently shelved until it became evident after the Court of Justice's
opinion in BAT and Reynolds v. Commission in 1987 that such a regu-
lation was necessary. 33
The Community courts alleviated the situation by interpreting Arti-
cles 81 and 82 to give the Commission authority to regulate mergers
after they were consummated, 34 but the Commission desired legisla-
tion that expressly addressed regulating mergers before they were
consummated. 35 Articles 81 and 82 dealt with competition law, but
lacked specific language concerning merger regulations. 36
Article 81 deals mainly with cartel behavior and prohibits "agree-
ments ... decisions ... and concerted practices" between companies
that affected markets across Member States, and expressing a need for one at the Community
level).
29. MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC, supra note 21, at ix. See WESSELING, supra note 14, at
45. "[C]oncentrations on a European scale logically required control at the supranational, Euro-
pean level. The Territorial reach of national merger control laws proved insufficient for adminis-
tering the European-wide processes." Id.
30. HILDEBRAND. supra note 28. at 83. See MERGER CONTROL IN THE EEC. supra note 21. at
ix.
31. See WESSELING, supra note 14, at 137. The "one-stop shop" was seen as a welcome inno-
vation because it created clarity for business and competition authorities. Id.
32. KORAH. supra note 14. at 262.
33. Id. at 262-63. See WESSELiNG, supra note 14. at 45. In BAT and Reynolds v. Commission.
the Court of Justice held that certain types of mergers could fall within the prohibition of Article
81. Id.
34. O'Toole, supra note 25, at 212. See Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v.
Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487 (CJ) (stating that Article 81 can be applied to prohibit certain
mergers): see also Case 6/72 Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973
E.C.R. 215. 27-28 (Article 82 is applicable to merger regulations).
35. KORAH. supra note 14. at 5. Before the Merger Regulation was adopted, the Commission
had no authority to require pre-merger notifications. Id. at 262. Cf. FTC Commissioner Thomas
Leary Speaks on "The Essential Stability of Merger Policy in the United States" (Jan. 17. 2002), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/01/learyparis.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) (discussing the U.S. an-
titrust legislation, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger Notification Act, which created mandatory
pre-merger filings over a certain threshold).
36. See O'Toole. supra note 25. at 213: see also Bertolini & Parisi, supra note 23. at 16.
1290 [Vol. 52:1285
THE FAILED GE/HONEYWELL MERGER
that "prevent, restrict, or distort" competition in the common mar-
ket.37 The main activities that it prohibits include the following: col-
luding to fix prices, dividing markets or territories, and discriminating
in prices between customers. 38 The Community courts found Article
81 was inapplicable to mergers because when a full merger occurs, the
two corporations cease to exist and a single entity remains. 39 In the
Phillip Morris cases, 40 the courts extended Article 81 to prohibit cer-
tain types of mergers, but only in a very narrow sense. Thus, the at-
tempt to liberally interpret Article 81 to cover certain mergers did not
resolve the Commission's desire for a merger regulation at the Com-
munity level.
When the courts determined that Article 81 did not authorize full
merger regulations, its attention turned toward Article 82, which dealt
with the abuse of a "dominant position. ' 41 The seminal case establish-
ing Article 82 as applicable to merger control was Europemballage
and Continental Can v. Commission,42 where a firm with a dominant
position acquired a direct competitor.43 In that case, the EC argued
that the elimination of a direct competitor helped to strengthen Conti-
nental Can's dominant position.44 However, even though this case
started a shift in merger control in the EC, it had a limited scope. For
Article 82 to apply, the EC had to show that one of the merging par-
ties had an existing dominant position in a relevant market before it
could successfully challenge the merger.45 Therefore, if neither party
to the merger had a dominant position, Article 82 could not be used to
block it, even if the merger created a dominant position for the newly
created corporation.
37. Article 81(1) (former Article 85) provides that: "The following shall be prohibited as in-
compatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decision by associa-
tions of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between member states
and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market .... " KORAH, supra note 14. at 2.
38. See WILLIAM RAWLINSON & MALACHY CORNWELL-KELLY. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw -A PRACTITIONER's GuimE 229-34 (2d ed. 1994).
39. O'Toole, supra note 25, at 212-13.
40. Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4487 (CJ).
41. Article 82 (former Article 86) states: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a domi-
nant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between member states."
See KORAH, supra note 14, at 3.
42. Case 6/72. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission. 1973 E.C.R.
215.
43. See id. The court held that Continental Can violated Article 86 by acquiring Thomassen, a
potential rival in the German market. See also O'Toole. supra note 25, at 213-14.
44. Europemballage. 1973 E.C.R. 215, 1 18.
45. See Bertolini & Parisi. supra note 23, at 20.
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Although the extensions of Articles 81 and 82 through case law
were limited in scope, they did help swing the balance of merger regu-
lation control to the EC away from the Member States. A combina-
tion of events, including these legal developments, helped ensure that
a merger regulation would be adopted by the EC.46 They played a
part in strengthening not just the argument that merger regulation
would better serve the new common market at the supranational, Eu-
ropean level, but also that the EC was capable of handling this area of
antitrust law.47
In 1989, the Member States and Council struck an accord and cre-
ated Regulation 4064/89 (Merger Regulation). 4s The effect of this
regulation was to create "one-stop shopping," which would allow par-
ties attempting to merge to seek approval only from the Commission,
instead of from all concerned Member States. It allowed the Commis-
sion to avoid having to meet the requirements of Articles 81 and 82 to
regulate mergers.49 It also took the EC one step closer to a unified
common market.50 The Merger Regulation gave the Commission the
power to prohibit any "concentration which creates or strengthens a
46. WESSELING, supra note 14, at 45. The other events that helped make merger regulation
control possible at the Community level included the finalization of the Internal Market pro-
gram, which drastically changed the business dynamic in the internal market. Id. The program
forecasted that when the internal market would be completed in 1992, the amount of mergers
would increase dramatically. Id. The other event was that these mergers. or concentrations, on
a Community scale, logically required a set of merger guidelines at the Community level. Id. It
would be insufficient and ineffectual to apply the merger control rules of each Member State to
these mergers. Id. These developments helped strengthen the Commission's argument that
merger control guidelines should be created at the Community level. Id.
47. See WESSELING, supra note 14. With the tension of the merger regulation enforcement
procedure between the EC and the Member States, these events helped enforce the argument
that it would be possible to implement a merger regulation policy at the national level without
any of the Member States being adversely affected. Id. Eventually with the unification of the
common market, it seemed inevitable that the EC would need to implement its own policy. but
once current events strengthened the EC's argument, the Member States were more willing to
play along. 1I.
48. Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
1990 O.J. (L 257) 13, as amended by Council Regulation 1310/97. 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 [hereinaf-
ter EC Merger Regulation].
49. O'Toole. supra note 25. at 216-17. See WESSELING. supra note 14. at 137. The EC made
"one-stop shopping" possible by its idea of mutual exclusivity of Community and national
merger control jurisdiction. Id. If the proposed merger falls within the Community dimension.
the Commission has exclusive control. Id. The usual parallel applicability of Community and
national competition laws was abandoned. Id. Compare this with the double-barrier theory
which governs the relationship between the Community and national competition laws in the
area of Articles 81 and 82. Id. at 138.
50. O'Toole. supra note 25, at 217. See also Derek Ridyard. An Economic Perspective on the
EC Merger Regulation. 6 EUR. COMPET-IFION L. REV. 247 (1990). As the borders are broken
down, the market is more likely defined as European rather than national. Id.
1292
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dominant position . . . .,, To fall within the scope of the Merger
Regulation, the proposed merger must satisfy a two-pronged test:
First, it must be a concentration, and second, it must have a Commu-
nity dimension. 52 The Merger Regulation applied to concentrations
that included "traditional mergers and acquisitions, but also cover[ed]
certain joint ventures ... that are 'concentrative' rather than 'coopera-
tive' in nature. '53
Once the Commission finds that the proposed merger is a concen-
tration within the meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation, the
concentration then must have a "Community dimension" in order for
the EC to have jurisdiction. 54 A Community dimension is found
where:
(1) Combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than ECU 2500 million, (2) In each of at least
three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million, (3) In each
of at least three Member States ... the aggregate turnover of each
of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 25
million, and (4) The aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of
at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100
million; unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more
than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within
one and the same Member State.55
51. EC Merger Regulation. supra note 48. at art. 2, 1 3. Article 2. paragraph 3 of the Merger
Regulation. states: "A concentration which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result
of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the common market." Id.
52. Crystal Jones-Starr. Community- Wide v. Worldwide Competition: Why European Enforce-
ment Agencies Are Able to Force American Companies to Modify Their Merger Proposals and
Limit Their Innovations, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145. 151 (1999).
53. Waller, supra note 15, at 73. See EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48, at art. 3, $ 1
(stating that a merger shall be considered to be a concentration when either: 1) two or more
previously independent undertakings merge: or 2) one or more persons, already controlling at
least one undertaking or one or more undertakings. acquire. whether by purchase of securities or
assets. by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one
or more other undertakings): see also EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48. at art. 3. $ 2 (the
creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph l(b)): JOSE
RIVAS. THE EU MERGER REGULATION AND iHE ANATOMY OF THE MERGER TASK FORCE 4
(1999).
54. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48. at art. 1. T 2.
55. Id. at art. 1. 1 3. Concentrations will be notifiable to the Commission if the parties' com-
bined global turnover exceeds ECU 2.5 billion: if each of at least two parties has Community-
wide turnover exceeding ECU 100 million: if in each of at least three Member States the parties'
combined turnover exceeds ECU 100 million: and if in each of the same three states, each of at
least two parties has turnover exceeding ECU 25 million. Id. As with the normal threshold rule,
the transaction is not reportable if each of the parties achieves more than two-thirds of its aggre-
gate Community-wide turnover within one and the same Member State. Id.
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The financial thresholds in the original Merger Regulation were
high. 56 This was acknowledged at the time of its adoption, and to con-
tinually review its merger regulation jurisdiction, the EC drafted Arti-
cle 1 to create automatic review of the Community threshold within
the fourth year following the adoption of the Merger Regulation.57 In
fact, the original threshold was so high that it only encompassed merg-
ers between corporate giants.5 8 The EU amended the Merger Regula-
tion to a lower threshold to ensure that a "one-stop shop" system
applied.59 If a merger meets or exceeds this threshold, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the EC, and the Commission applies its Merger
Regulation.60 If a merger does not meet the threshold, then the regu-
lation of the merger falls to the individual Member States.61
56. Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257). Under the original threshold re-
quirements, there would be a Community dimension if:
(a) the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the undertakings concerned is more
than ECU 500 million: and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of
the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Commu-
nity-wide turnover within one and the same Member State.
Id. at art. 1, 2.
57. Id. at art. 1, $ 3. See also WESSELING, supra note 14, at 132.
58. WESSELING, supra note 14, at 136. The thresholds were set high as a compromise with the
Member States by the EC in exchange for a Community-level merger control regulation. Wil-
liam Elland, The Mergers Control Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 11 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV.
111, 111 (1990). Not all Member States advocated high thresholds however. Smaller Member
States were for low thresholds because they had no effective merger control and so the Commu-
nity Merger Regulation would have greatly helped them. It was the larger Member States with
highly developed merger controls that sought high threshold levels in order to protect them-
selves from losing domestic control. Id.
59. William M. Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 287, 290 (2000). The thresholds were amended "to allow for a some-
what more subtle recognition of Community and Member State interests in a given merger."
WESSELING. supra note 14, at 132.
60. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48, at art. 1, 3. See also WESSELING, supra note 14, at
133-35. There are four exceptions to this mutually exclusive jurisdictional division to avoid al-
lowing all mergers that exceed the threshold requirement from falling into the Community's
jurisdiction. Id. The first exception is expressly stated in the Merger Regulation itself, where if
the merger involves companies that achieve two-thirds of their turnover in one Member State,
then it does not have a Community dimension. Id. The second exception occurs when the
merger does not have a Community dimension, but a Member State may request that the Com-
mission examine that particular merger. Id. If the request is made, then the Commission may
proceed to examine the proposed merger as if the merger had a Community dimension. Id. The
third exception is the reverse of the second, where the Commission may refer a proposed merger
that has a Community dimension to a Member State to examine. Id. And the final exception
can be found in Article 21(3) of the Merger Regulation, which allows Member States to take
appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests not expressly mentioned in the Merger Reg-
ulation itself. WESSELING, supra note 14, at 133-35; EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48, at art.
1. 2(b): art. 22. 3: art. 9: art. 21, 3.
61. EC Merger Regulation. supra note 48. at art. 21, 1 3.
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When the Commission finds that the proposed merger falls within
the scope of the Merger Regulation and concludes it does not "raise
serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market," the
Commission will allow the merger to proceed. 62 If however, the Com-
mission finds that the merger falls within the scope and "raises serious
doubts as to its compatibility with the common market," the Commis-
sion shall proceed to enter a Phase II investigation and evaluate
whether the merger will create or strengthen a dominant position. 63 If
after the investigation the Commission determines that the merger is
incompatible with the common market, it has the power to deny the
merger, 64 or demand undertakings 65 to allow the merger to proceed.66
De Havilland67 and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas68 are two examples of
how the EC implemented the Merger Regulation. The two cases also
illustrate the progression of the EC's merger regulation policy.
1. The de Havilland Case69
In 1991, shortly after the EC adopted its Merger Regulation, the
Commission flexed its newly-formed muscles to block a merger be-
tween two companies that did not maintain a presence within the EC.
The merger involved combining Avions de Transport Regional (ATR)
with de Havilland, a Canadian division of the Boeing Company. 70 In
1982, ATR was created primarily to design, develop, manufacture, and
sell regional transport aircraft. 71 The Commission, pursuant to Article
6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation, initiated proceedings because it
found legitimate concerns that the merger raised anticompetitive ef-
fects in the common market.7 2
First, the Commission examined whether the proposed merger sat-
isfied the first prong of the Merger Regulation, that it was in fact a
concentration. The Commission held that the merger fell within the
62. Id. at art. 6, J 1(b).
63. I(. at art. 6. 1 (c).
64. Id. at art. 8. 3.
65. Undertakings are equivalent to concessions or divestitures of business operations or assets
in the United States.
66. EC Merger Regulation. supra note 48, at art. 8. 2.
67. Case IV/M.053, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland v. Commission. 1991 O.J. (C 128) 42.
68. Case IV/M.877. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas v. Commission. 1997 O.J. (C 59) 16.
69. De Havilland, 1991 O.. (C 128) 42.
70. Id. 91 1. ATR is jointly controlled by Aerospatiale SNIA (Aerospatiale), a French aero-
space company. and Alenia-Aeritalia e Silna SpA (Alenia), an Italian aerospace company. See
id. 3. De Havilland manufactures regional turbo-prop aircraft. Id. 1 4.
71. Id. $ 3. ATR. controlled by Aerospatiale and Alenia. at the time of the merger was the
leading European and world manufacturer of regional aircraft.
72. See id. 91 2.
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scope of the Merger Regulation since de Havilland would be run by
an operating company, which would be jointly controlled by Aerospa-
tiale and Alenia, and the activities of Aerospatiale and Alenia in re-
gional turbo-prop aircraft (commuters) was already concentrated in
the GIE ATR in 1982. 73
Applying the Community dimension test, the Commission found
that the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging com-
panies exceeded ECU 5 billion, each party had a Community-wide
turnover exceeding ECU 250 million, and neither company achieved
more than two-thirds of its Community-wide turnover within the same
Member State. 74 Thus, the concentration had a Community dimen-
sion. Because the proposed merger was considered a concentration
with a Community dimension, it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Commission.
After examining the potential effects of the proposed merger on the
market, the Commission concluded that the new entity ATR/de Havil-
land would have a very strong position in the market. 75 That strong
position, combined with weak competition in the market and the lim-
ited bargaining power of customers, forced the Commission to con-
clude that the merger would create a dominant position. 76  The
Commission felt that because this dominant position was not tempo-
rary and barriers to post-merger entry were substantial, the merger
would "significantly imped[e] effective competition," and therefore, it
decided to prohibit the merger. 77
2. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Case78
Six years after de Havilland, the EC investigated the proposed
merger between Boeing Company (Boeing) and McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC). 79 Applying the Merger Regulation to determine
73. De Havilland. 1991 O.J. (C 128) 42.
74. Id. T 6. The Commission examined this proposed merger in 1991, while the old Commu-
nitv dimension threshold was still in effect.
75. The merger would strengthen ATR's position in the commuter markets because of: (1)
high combined market share: (2) elimination of de Havilland as a competitor (3) the new entity
would be the sole commuter manufacturer in the commuter markets: and (4) ATR would have a
significantly larger customer base. Id. 27. For more in-depth analysis of the Commission's
conclusions, see id. 11 28-33.
76. See id. 51. The Commission stated that "the combination of these factors leads to the
conclusion that the new entity could act to a significant extent independently of its competitors
and customers, and would thus have a dominant position on the commuter markets." Id.
77. De Havilland, 1991 OJ. (C 128), 53.
78. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp.. 1997 O.J. (C 59) 16.
79. Id. 1 1. Boeing operates in two major areas: commercial aircraft, and defense and space.
Id. 91 3. McDonnell Douglas Company (MDC) operates in four principal areas: military aircraft:
missile, space and electronic systems: commercial aircraft: and financial services. Id. 1 4.
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whether it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the EC, the Com-
mission found that the merger constituted a concentration within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Merger Regulation because Boeing was to
acquire entire control of MDC.80 The merger also had a Community
dimension because Boeing and MDC had a combined aggregate
worldwide turnover above the minimum threshold of ECU five bil-
lion.81 Each had a Community-wide turnover in excess of ECU 250
million, and neither had more than two-thirds of their aggregate Com-
munity-wide turnover within a single Member State.8 2 Thus, the
Commission held that the proposed merger fell within the Merger
Regulation and subsequently concluded that it raised the prospect of
possible anticompetitive effects within the common market. There-
fore, it initiated proceedings pursuant to Article 6(1)(c). 83
This merger dealt with two major markets, the commercial aviation
market and U.S. defense market. The Commission examined only the
civil side of the operation because it determined in its initial proceed-
ings that no dominant position was established in the defense sector in
the wake of the merger.84
Because this merger would require review in the United States, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewed the merger. After an ex-
tensive investigation, the FTC declared that it would not challenge the
merger.85 The EC took a different view, announcing that the pro-
posed merger raised serious competition concerns for the common
market. 86 After performing its entire analysis, the EC concluded that
Boeing held a dominant position in the overall market for large com-
80. Id. T 6. Pursuant to the merger. MDC would become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boe-
ing. Id. 91 5.
81. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1997 O.J. (C 59), 7. Boeing's turnover was approxi-
matelv ECU 17 billion, and MDC's ECU It billion.
82. Id.
83. See id. 91 2. After examining the notification of the merger, the Commission concluded
that it raised serious doubts as to its procompetitive effects on the market. Thus, it decided to
open up a more full investigation to determine whether the merger should be blocked. See also
EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48. at art. 6, 91 1(c).
84. See Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1997 O.J. (C 59). 12. There was also the concern
voiced by the Americans that the EC should not intervene in the national defense market for
national security reasons. It would add an intriguing twist to international antitrust enforcement
if the EC could regulate how the U.S. government hands out military contracts and research and
development grants.
85. See Statement of Robert Pitofsky et al., In the Matter of the Boeing Company/McDonnell
Douglas Corporation. at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/9707/boeingsta.htm (last visited Jan. 30.
2003).
86. See Jeffrey A. Miller. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Merger: The European Cominis-
sion's Costly Failure to Properly Enforce the Merger Regulation. 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRAmDi 359.
362-63 (1999).
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mercial jet aircraft. 87 Boeing's merger with MDC would thus
strengthen this dominant position, in contravention of the Merger
Regulation. The merger would strengthen Boeing's position in the
large commercial aircraft market, and there would be significant spill-
over effects on to Boeing's position in large commercial aircraft re-
sulting from the increase in Boeing's overall resources and defense
and space business. 8 After the Commission declared that it intended
to block the merger, a settlement was struck at the eleventh hour be-
tween Boeing and the Commission in which Boeing agreed to conces-
sions to allow the merger to proceed.8 9 Thus, before Boeing agreed to
various concessions, the Commission declared that the "proposed con-
centration would lead to the strengthening of a dominant position
through which effective competition would be significantly impeded
.... "90 However, because Boeing agreed to the concessions, the EC
decided that the merger would not strengthen a dominant position
and therefore, it could proceed. 91
87. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp.. 1997 O.J. (C 59), $1 52. For more analysis see id. J $ 21-
51. There were several reasons why the Commission came to this conclusion. The most impor-
tant included the current market shares of Boeing, the size of its fleet in service, the recent
conclusion of long-term exclusivity supply deals with major customers, and lack of potential
entrants. Id. 1 52. There are only three major competitors in the large commercial jet aircraft
market, Boeing, MDC. and Airbus Industrie, a consortium of European companies. The Com-
mission found that Boeing's market share during the 1990s was approximately 60%. and com-
bined with MDC it increased to approximately 70%. These high market shares indicated a
strong position in the overall market. Examining Airbus's difficulty to improve its position in
the past decade while at the same time noticing that Boeing was able to continually increase its
market share, the Commission felt Boeing's market share indicated a position of dominance,
where it was able to behave independently of its rivals. Id. 91 21-38.
88. Id. 91 53.
89. Before the Commission made its decision, a fifteen member advisory panel, consisting of
the chiefs of Member States' antitrust enforcement agencies, recommended to the Commission
to block the merger. See Anne Swardson, EU Panel Urges Rejection of Boeing-McDonnell
Merger, WASH. POST, July 5, 1997. at F9. Even the day before the Commission was to announce
its decision, Karel Van Miert, the EU's Commissioner for competition at the time, declared that
the Commission was going to block the deal. Id.
90. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1997 O.J. (C 59). 91 113. Cf Karpel, supra note 11, at
1040 (discussing the FTC's investigation of the merger, which concluded that the merger could
continue because MDC no longer was a "meaningful competitive force in the commercial air-
craft market," and that there was nothing that MDC could do, alone or otherwise, to change its
position). Id. (citing In re Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corp., FTC, file no. 971-0051
(July 1, 1997), at 3).
91. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1997 O.J. (C 59). 124. Three major concessions ac-
cepted by Boeing were: agreeing to not enter any future exclusive agreements until August 2007.
as well as not enforcing its current exclusivity deals with American, Delta, and Continental air-
lines, running MDC's commercial division as a separate legal entity for a period of ten years; and
licensing of nonexclusive "government-funded" patents to other jet aircraft manufacturers. Id.
91 114-119. See also. Karpel, supra note 11, at 1045.
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III. COMPARING THE UNITED STATES' AND THE EC's
MERGER REGULATIONS
In order to understand the diverging results of this merger analysis,
it is important to examine both U.S. and EC antitrust agencies and
how both are structured. Understanding the different structures and
historical developments of the agencies helps illustrate how each
agency functions and how merger cases are initially approached.
In the United States, the two primary agencies dealing with and en-
forcing competition laws are the DOJ and FTC.92 The DOJ, under
the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, has an
antitrust division, which is headed by an assistant attorney general. 93
It enforces the Sherman Act and, jointly with the FTC, the Clayton
Act.9
4
The FTC is an independent regulatory agency that was created by
the Federal Trade Commission Act, and it is in charge of enforcing the
Robinson-Patman Act as well as, along with the DOJ, the Clayton
Act.95 The FTC, headed by five commissioners appointed by the
President, has full authority to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate
applications for merger approval. 96 If the administrative law judge,
who presides over the adjudicatory process, decides in favor of the
FTC, the adverse party may appeal to the full commission, and then
subsequently to the federal appellate court.97
Both U.S. antitrust agencies play more of a "prosecutorial" role, in
terms of the procedural structure, than the EC. The DOJ cannot
92. Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the Boeing/McDonnell-
Douglas Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 826 (1999). See
Timothy J. Muris, Merger Enforcement in a World of Multiple Arbiters. Prepared Remarks
Before Brookings Institution Roundtable on Trade and Investment Policy (Dec. 21, 2001). at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/brookings.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). There are other an-
titrust authorities present in the United States. including each of the fifty states. The Supreme
Court has held that merger control authorities at the state level can force further divestitures in a
merger case after the federal authorities had obtained divestitures and settled the case. Id. (cit-
ing California v. Am. Stores. 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990)). However, only twelve states currently
have merger control regulations. See Barry E. Hawk & Laraine L. Laudati. Antitrust Federalism
in the United States and Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in the European
Union: A Comparison. 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 18. 21 n.13 (1996).
93. The acting Attorney General at the time of this case was John Ashcroft. and the Assistant
Attorney General of the Antitrust Division was Charles A. James.
94. Stock, supra note 92, at 827. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994): 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Sher-
man Act and the Clayton Act cover the majority of antitrust law. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
deals specifically with merger regulations. and enforces the FTC in conjunction with the DOJ to
block mergers that it deems to have anticompetitive effects.
95. Stock. supra note 92. at 828. See The Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
96. Stock. supra note 92. at 828.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
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block a merger on its own. It must take the parties to court and con-
vince a federal judge, acting as an independent fact-finder, to do so.98
The FTC acts in a more regulatory role where it investigates proposed
mergers, and if it concludes that a merger will create anticompetitive
effects in the market, it will challenge it in front of an administrative
law judge.99 However, in both procedures, neither agency acts as both
investigator and fact-finder.
The EC, in comparison, plays more of an "administrative" role in
that it not only investigates and reviews mergers, but it has decision-
making powers over the mergers. 100 There is an avenue for the merg-
ing companies to get to the European Community courts, but it is
strictly an appellate review process.101 "This right of appeal does not
provide the same discipline in the review process as" that found in the
U.S. system.' 0 2 There is a fundamental difference between judicial re-
view after the merger has been prohibited, and a system where the
antitrust agency must persuade a court in order to prohibit the merger
in the first place. 103
A general difference also exists between the scope of competition
laws, or the concerns the intent of which the regulations are trying to
curb. In the United States, merger law "focuses on insuring a market
structure that will prevent oligopolistic coordination and preserve
competition to keep the leading firm or firms in line, while EU merger
law focuses on preventing the leading firm from strengthening and
abusing its position .... ,104 While EU merger regulations seem to be
mainly concerned with unilateral actions by a dominant firm, U.S. law
focuses on preventing collusion between competitors. 10 5 This is most
likely a result of differing cultures and purposes for creating such
legislation. 106
To illustrate why the U.S. view focuses on preventing oligopolistic
coordination, Robert Pitofsky summarized the three dangers of al-
lowing mergers to occur that result in enhanced market power:
98. Kolasky. supra note 18.
99. Stock. supra note 92. at 828.
100. See Mario Monti, Antitrust in the US and Europe: A History of Convergence (Nov. 14.
2001). Address Before the General Counsel Roundtable American Bar Association, at http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/01/54(-0---
RAPID&lg=en (last visited Jan. 30. 2003).
101. Kolasky. supra note 18.
102. Donna E. Patterson & Carl Shapiro. Transatlantic Divergence in GE/Honeywell: Causes
and Lessons. ANrITRUST. Fall 2001. at I8. 22.
103. Id.
104. Stock, supra note 92. at 833-34.
105. Id. at 830-31.
106. See infra note 110.
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[M]ergers can provide a convenient route to monopoly as firms buy
out rivals and then raise prices to consumers. Mergers are also a
matter of concern because when only a few firms account for all or
most sales of a product, they may be able to behave like monopo-
lists and more easily coordinate their sales policies to extract higher
prices and earn greater profits at the expense of consumers. Be-
yond these specific concerns ... there is a generalized view that, in
noncompetitive markets, incentives to achieve efficiency, to inno-
vate and to drive down prices will diminish.10 7
Thus, the three dangers of mergers include: monopoly creation, cartel
facilitation, and lethargic enterprise. 10 8
In the United States, all three concerns are somewhat addressed in
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, "which prohibits mergers whose effects
'may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly."'" 0 9 However, despite the equal emphasis on the three dan-
gers, it seems that the enforcement of the statute has been mainly
focused on cartel facilitation, or collusion.' 10 One example highlight-
ing this focus was the 1984 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which con-
centrated mostly on the problems of market collusion and barely
touched on the problems of unilateral activity that created anticompe-
titive effects.' ''
Conversely, the EC is seemingly geared more to focus on prevent-
ing "anticompetitive conduct committed by the leading firm of an in-
dustry."' 12 Indeed, the language of Article 2 of the Merger
Regulation states a merger is "incompatible with the common market
if it 'creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it.' '"i 3 One member of the FTC has
stated, "It is fair to say that the EC focuses more on single firm domi-
nance and the United States focuses more on oligopoly
coordination."' 14
107. Robert Pitofsky. Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy. 81 GEO. L.J. 195. 195 (1992) (footnote omitted).
108. Stock. supra note 92, at 830.
109. Id. at 831 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994)).
110. Stock, supra note 92. at 831. A possible explanation for this could be that historically,
antitrust policy began as an attempt to prevent industrial trusts from colluding and raising prices.
Id. Collusion is when two or more competitors agree to restrict output or to raise prices in order
to increase their profitability at the expense of efficiency and consumers.
111. Id. See 1992 A.B.A. SEc. ANTIrRusT. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Com-
mentary and Text 12-13.
112. Stock, supra note 92, at 832.
113. Id. (citing EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48. at art. 2, 1 3).
114. Stock. supra note 92. at 834 (quoting Debra A. Valentine. Building a Cooperative Frame-
work for Oversight in Mergers-The Answer to E.traterritorial Issues in Merger Review. 6 GEO.
MASON L. REX'. 525. 528 (1998)).
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A final distinction between the two major merger regulations hinges
on the factors taken into consideration during the analysis. The EU
considers non-economic factors, such as political and social considera-
tions. 115 Although economics play a major role in analysis, the EU is
more vocal about these other factors. 116 The former EC Competition
Commissioner Karel Van Miert has stated:
The aims of European Community's competition policy are eco-
nomic, political and social. The policy is concerned not only with
promoting efficient production but also achieving the aims of the
European treaties .... To this must be added the need to safeguard
a pluralistic democracy, which could not survive a strong concentra-
tion of economic power.1 17
The EC has been known to protect competition, even at the expense
of the consumer. 118 For example, "when considering factors in addi-
tion to market share, [EU merger-review authorities] are likely to find
damning those qualities, such as excellent technology or customer ser-
vice, that generally would win praise in the American courts." 119 The
United States, on the other hand, relies almost solely on economic
analysis. 120
IV. ANALYSIS: THE EC's DECISION TO BLOCK THE GE/
HONEYWELL MERGER
On October 22, 2000, GE agreed to acquire Honeywell in a pro-
posed $45 billion merger.' 2' The deal stated that GE would purchase
Honeywell in an all-stock transfer where Honeywell would become a
wholly-owned subsidiary. 122 At the time of the merger, GE was active
in the market for supplying jet engines for large commercial and re-
gional aircraft. 123 Honeywell was heavily involved in the markets for
jet engines for large and small regional aircraft, avionics and non-avi-
115. Id. at 835.
116. Id.
117. Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens. Assumptions, Goals, and Dominant Undertakings: The
Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union. 64 ANTIRUST L.J. 443, 450
(1996).
118. Stock, supra note 92, at 836.
119. Id. (quoting Jebsen & Stevens, supra note 117, at 479).
120. Stock, supra note 92, at 834. In the past. the United States factored in social and populist
ideals, but has since moved away from relying on those factors. Id.
121. General Electric to Acquire Honeywell in a Merger for $45 Billion; Honeywell Shareown-
ers Receive GE Stock; Jack Welch to Continue as Chairman Until End of 2001 (Oct. 22, 2000). at
http://www.ge.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
122. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 5. On October 22, 2000, GE and Honeywell agreed
to merge Honeywell with GE 2000 Merger Sub, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of GE. The
result would have made Honeywell a wholly-owned subsidiary of GE. Id.
123. Id. IT 14-29.
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onics products, and engine-starters.' 24 These aerospace markets are
made up of a few very large and powerful competitors. 25 The market
can sustain only a small number of very large firms because each
needs a large plant capacity to achieve the necessary economies of
scale, as well as access to large amounts of capital. This is due to the
extremely high fixed costs that dominate this type of industry.' 26
On May 2, 2001, the DOJ gave its conditional clearance of the pro-
posed merger.1 27 The DOJ stated that the merger could proceed as
long as the newly merged companies divested Honeywell's military
helicopter engine business, and authorized an additional U.S.-based
third-party service provider for certain models of Honeywell aircraft,
engines, and auxiliary power units.t28 The parties' agreement to these
conditions quelled concerns by the DOJ that the merger "would have
reduced competition in the market for the production of U.S. military
helicopter engines and the market for the provision of heavy mainte-
nance, repair, and overhaul services for certain Honeywell aircraft en-
gines and auxiliary power units."' 29
However, the EC did not agree. Upon undertaking its investiga-
tion, the Commission held up the merger and stated that it would
open a full investigation of the deal. 130 The Commission's reason for
further review was that there were three possible anticompetitive ef-
124. Id. I 19-33 230-340. Engine starters are vital to the operation of the aircraft engine,
and Honeywell is a major independent distributor to several engine manufacturers. See id. $T
331-340.
125. Each product market has only about three to four major competitors, with some, the
large regional aircraft jet engine market, only having two major competitors. See id. 9-35
(discussing the Commission's analysis of the jet aircraft markets that GE competes in). See also
GE/Honevwell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), I 241-275 (discussing the Commission's analysis of the avion-
ics and non-avionics markets that Honeywell competes in).
126. The fixed costs that arise in the aerospace markets include heavy spending on research
and development in new technology and the manufacturing of complex and expensive products.
Id. 423. The engine starters market is an example of the high fixed costs involved. Id. To
compete in the manufacturing of engine starters, a manufacturing company would need to invest
giant amounts of money in research and development, a worldwide product support network.
and the latest technology to have the capability to manufacture such products. Id.
127. GE, Honeywell Merger Cleared, supra note 2, at 431.
128. Id.
129. Id. There were fears that without the divestiture, the market for the next generation of
advanced U.S. military helicopter engines would have experienced higher prices, lower quality.
and less innovation. Id. at 432.
130. EU Opens Full Investigation, supra note 3. at 217. This report is also available at http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh. After an initial investigation, the Commission initiates
a full investigation only when there are "serious doubts" that the merger will not create anticom-
petitive effects. See EC Merger Regulation. supra note 48, at art. 6. 1(c). A full investigation
extends the Commission's need to make a final decision for four months and allows it to scruti-
nize and make a detailed assessment of the impact of the transaction on competition. Id. at art.
10. 3.
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fects stemming from the transaction. 3 1 The first effect was a possible
horizontal overlap between the two parties in the large regional jet
engine market, which could lead to a significant reduction in the de-
gree of competition. 132 The only two competitors in that market were
GE and Honeywell. The second effect was a possible vertical effect
due to Honeywell supplying parts to competing engine manufactur-
ers. 33 Finally, the third effect was a conglomerate effect resulting
from possible product bundling of engines with avionics and non-avi-
onics parts.' 34 The full investigation focused on whether a dominant
position would be created or strengthened by the merger, and whether
anticompetitive effects in the market would result.' 35
After the full investigation, the Commission expressed its concerns
that the merger would strengthen GE's existing dominant position in
the manufacturing of jet engines for large commercial and large re-
gional jets, as well as create a dominant position for Honeywell in the
market of supplying avionics, non-avionics, and corporate jet en-
gines.' 36 The Commission felt that Honeywell would assume a domi-
nant position in the markets of supplying avionics and non-avionics
products by vertically integrating with GE's financial arms in GE Cap-
ital and GE Capital Aviation Services (GECAS), which handle finan-
cial services and aircraft purchasing and leasing, respectively. 137 The
131. EU Opens Full Investigation, supra note 3, at 217.
132. Id. The Commission separated the regional jet engine market into large and small prod-
uct markets. The large regional jet engine market consisted of seventy to ninety or more seats.
and the small regional jet engine market consists of planes with thirty to fifty seats. GE/Honey-
well. 2001 O.J. (C 46), T 20. GE and Honeywell were the only current engine manufacturers in
the large regional jet engine market. Id. T 21. A horizontal merger can have anticompetitive
effects because it eliminates a competitor and may enable the merged firm to restrict output and
raise price. Kolasky, supra note 18.
133. EU Opens Full Investigation, supra note 3, at 217. Vertical mergers are challenged when
they eliminate a supplier in the vertical chain in the industry, and it results in the new entity's
ability to restrict output and raise prices. Kolasky, supra note 18. Honeywell is currently the
leading supplier of engine starters to engine manufacturers. GE/lloneywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 91
331. And with GE having a dominant position in the jet engine market, the merger creates a
vertical relationship with Honeywell. Id. The Commission felt that this vertical relationship
could create anticompetitive effects because GE would then have control over supplying vital
engine parts to its direct competitors. Id. T1 420.
134. EU Opens Full Investigation, supra note 3, at 217. Although GE and Honeywell are not.
for the most part. direct competitors, they manufacture complementary products in the jet en-
gine markets. See GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 91 412. Given these complementary products
and each party's leading market positions there would be a conglomerate effect: the newly
merged entity would have the ability to create packaged product deals. Id. The effect of these
packaged deals would be a strengthening of GE's existing dominant position. Id. See also id. 91
355. This also leads to a creation of a dominant position for Honeywell. Id.
135. EU Opens Full Investigation, supra note 3, at 217.
136. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 1 341.
137. Id. 91 344.
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Commission felt that Honeywell would immediately be able to take
advantage of GE Capital's financial strength as well as its ability to get
Honeywell's products placed exclusively on new platforms.1 38
Through this financial strength and ability to leverage into new plat-
forms, the Commission thought Honeywell would be able to get its
products placed on new platforms at the expense of its competitors.1 39
Honeywell would also have an advantage over its competitors with its
alliance with GECAS, a major aircraft purchaser. The Commission
felt that GECAS would extend its GE-only policy to Honeywell prod-
ucts, thus locking out Honeywell's rivals.140 The effects of Honeywell
using GE Capital's financial strength and GECAS's purchasing power
would not only give Honeywell an advantage over its competitors in
the short term, resulting in its rivals' loss of revenues, but it would in
turn affect its rivals' future investments in research and development
due to a lack of capital.14' These long-term effects of diminishing rev-
enues earmarked for research and development would cause Honey-
well's rivals to be unable to develop future generation products,
ultimately resulting in foreclosure from the market.1 42
The Commission also felt that through bundling of the new entity's
complementary goods, this merger would create a dominant position
in the market for supplying avionics and non-avionics products, as
well as strengthen GE's dominant position in the large commercial
and regional aircraft engine markets. 43 The new entity's ability to
bundle its engines with its avionics and non-avionics products would
allow it to create more attractive package offers and lower prices than
138. Id. 91 344.
139. Id. 91 347. This would impact Honeywell's rivals by delaying revenues that would have
resulted from placing products on these platforms. and thus reducing their ability to fund their
future research and development. Id.
140. Id. Being owned by GE. GECAS has a GE-only purchase policy. The Commission con-
cluded that the combination of GECAS's influential buying power and its likely extension to
purchase airplanes equipped only with Honeywell products would have anticompetitive effects
in the market and would eventually lead to market loreclosure of Honeywell's rivals, Rolls
Royce and Pratt & Whitney. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 9 344.
141. Id. 91 347.
142. Id. T 347-348.
143. Id. 91 355. Through bundling its products with GE's products. Honeywell will be able to
offer packaged deals that its competition will not be able to match. and thus will lose market
share as well as experience immediate damaging profit shrinkage. Id. As a result. Honeywell's
rivals will not able to effectively compete and will be eliminated from the market. Id. See also
GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 91 412. With the new ability to package offers of engines, avion-
ics. and non-avionics products as well as the related services. GE will be able to retain its cus-
tomers and gain new ones in the market for engines. Id. The effect of the product bundling will
be that its rivals will be forced to raise costs. Id. The product bundling will force GE's rivals to
either match prices, or attempt to find a partner to come up with a competitive bundled package.
Either way. the rivals' costs are likely to rise as a result. Id.
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its competition.t 44 These attractive package deals would induce price-
conscious customers to purchase GE engines and Honeywell products
over the competition's. 45 Although the effect of this might result in
lower prices in the short term, forcing rivals to cut prices and forego
higher revenues, by foregoing these revenues, the rivals would not be
able to invest as heavily in research and development for future gener-
ation projects, eventually leading to their marginalization and exit
from the market.1 46 Despite the recognized short-term efficiencies
that would result, the Commission felt that the long-term effects of
market foreclosure and exit by the competition outweighed the likely
efficiencies.147 The Commission refuted the argument of GE/Honey-
well that rivals would respond to the merger by getting together to
offer similar, competing packages.148 Absent integration, the Com-
mission stated, prices cannot be expected to be lower than those of the
merged entity. 149  It concluded that teaming was not a viable
alternative.
144. Id. $ 353. The merged entity will be able to price its package deals in such a way due to
its financial ability to cross-subsidize discounts across its product lines. Id.
145. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 353. The Commission's market analysis indicated
that GE's and Honeywell's customers, airframe manufacturers and airlines, are price-sensitive
customers. Id.
146. Id. $ 355. If a rival company attempts to compete in the short term, it would need to cut
its prices to match those of GE/Honeywell. Id. By cutting its costs, it chooses to forego revenue
streams that would be used primarily to fund its research and development for future generation
products. Id. By constantly bleeding revenues in the short term, the rival company will have less
and less capital for its long-term projects. thus progressively becoming marginalized from the
market. Id. Eventually in the long term, the rival company will not have enough capital to
constantly innovate and keep up with its competition, thus becoming foreclosed in the market.
GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), $ 355.
147. See Kolasky, supra note 18. The Commission believed that the lower prices that resulted
from bundling GE and Honeywell products were not real efficiencies, but were "strategic pric-
ing" that could not be sustained for a long period of time. But see Gotz Drauz, Unbundling GEl
Honeywell: The Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers Under EC Competition Law. Address
Presented at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 2001), at 15. It is suggested that the
Commission can not have it both ways. Either the Cournot effect is small or great. If it is small.
it does not seem likely that any rivals will leave the market. If the Cournot effect is great, the
prices stay low and consumers ultimately benefit. The "Cournot effect" is the effect that occurs
after a conglomerate merger takes place, and there is incentive for the new entity to lower prices
because "it causes the firm to internalize the negative externalities associated with higher
prices." Kolasky, supra note 18.
148. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 1 378. The Commission concluded that even if custom-
ers found these competing bundles attractive, they would not be viable alternatives because in
the absence of integration, they would not be able to match the prices of GE/Honeywell. Id.
The Commission also felt that teaming. as opposed to integration through merger. was much
more fragile because it involves having to coordinate two different entities and trying to avoid
conflicts of interest. Id. 379. The Commission also felt that teaming was not always desirable
for the consumer, because the effect of getting multiple firms together could create major addi-
tional administrative and managerial costs. Id. 380.
149. Id. $ 378.
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One major concern that the Commission focused on was GE/Hon-
eywell's ability to "pure" bundle, or "technical" bundle, its prod-
ucts.150 This kind of bundling restricts the individual components
from working with rivals' components, allowing them to function only
as part of a bundled system of its own products. 151 By technical bun-
dling, GE/Honeywell would make future replacement parts incompat-
ible with the existing products, forcing the airplane owner to continue
using GE/Honeywell parts. 52 Not only was the Commission con-
cerned by the incompatibility problem, but also the problem was com-
pounded with the fact that GE/Honeywell would be the only
integrated company in the industry. 153 Thus, with no other integrated
companies in the market, no one would be able to effectively counter
this bundling strategy with its own technical bundling.
The Commission also felt that GE could strengthen its dominant
position through vertically integrating with Honeywell's engine start-
ers. t 54 Honeywell is the major producer of engine starters for engine
manufacturers in direct competition with GE.1 55 By acquiring Honey-
well, GE would have a financial interest in disrupting the flow of these
engine starters to its direct competitors, ultimately foreclosing
competition. t56
In an attempt to address these concerns and salvage the merger, GE
proposed concessions, which were deemed insufficient.57 On June 28,
150. Id. 1 354.
151. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 1 351. As a result, technical bundling makes these
products incompatible with its rivals' components. Id.
152. Id. $ 354. Technical bundling could harm competitors more than mixed bundling because
competitors will find it more difficult to find platforms that will be compatible with its own parts.
Id. This restriction on market share will inevitably reduce the rival's ability to gain profits, thus
foreclosing it from the market. Id.
153. Id. 91 378.
154. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 1 419.
155. Id. 1 420. "Honeywell is the leading. if not the only. independent supplier of engine
starters." Id.
156. Id. The Commission stated that it is unlikely that another existing or potential manufac-
turer of engine-starters would be able to compete with Honeywell. Pratt & Whitney manufac-
tures engine starters mainly for its own capacity, but it would not have the economic incentive to
increase its production capacity nor does it have the resources to increase production to supply
GE's competitors. Id. 9 421. And as for potential manufacturers of engine-starters, the barriers
to entry are "significant" due to the sophistication of the products. the amount of capital neces-
sary for research and development, and the high costs of the equipment and international prod-
uct support network. Id. 1 423. Add in the high switching costs for engine starters, and it does
not seem feasible for a company to manufacture without having an economic incentive. GE/
Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). $ 423.
157. Id. 91 485. The proposed concessions by GE/Honeywell included the divestiture of cer-
tain avionics and non-avionics products. engine starters, small marine gas turbines, and large
regional jet engines. Id. Specifically, some of the divestitures included the Aeronautical Satel-
lite Communications business. Honeywell's European Environmental Control systems center.
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2001, after the deadline to submit undertakings, GE proposed further
concessions.' 58 However, the Commission refused to accept them be-
cause they did not sufficiently resolve the problems identified at such
a late stage in the procedure. 159
With the failure of negotiations between the parties, the EC
blocked the proposed merger.' 60 The EC based its decision to block
the merger on the fact that the merger would create or strengthen
dominant positions in several markets and "would have severely re-
duced competition in the aerospace industry and resulted ultimately in
higher prices for customers, particularly airlines."' 16t The combination
would have resulted in creation of dominant positions in markets for
the supply of avionics, non-avionics, and corporate jet engines, as well
as strengthening GE's existing dominant position in jet engines for
both commercial and large regional jets. 162
Honeywell's engine starter business, fifty percent of Honeywell's stake in its joint venture, Ver-
icor, where it markets its small marine gas turbines, and two engines that power current and
future Avro airplanes. Id. % 489-496. The proposal also included a non-compete agreement
where GE will not purchase corporate jet aircraft for operating leasing purposes. keeping GE-
CAS as a separate legal entity and conducting its business with Honeywell at a distance, and
commitments to not bundle GE products with Honeywell products, with certain exceptions. Id.
9 497-499.
158. Id. 91 534. After several failed attempts at negotiating acceptable concessions with the
EC, GE/Honeywell's final deal offered to divest $2.2 billion in revenue in Honeywell's aerospace
business. Honeywell Home Page, at http://www.honeywell.com/mediakit/announcement.jsp (last
visited Feb. 18, 2003). This divestiture included a new business regional jet engine, air turbine
starters, and certain avionics and non-avionics products. 1d. Despite what GE/Honeywell felt
was a major concession, the EC demanded further divestitures.
159. Dimitri Giotakos et al., General Electric/Honeywell-An Insight Into the Commission's
Investigation & Decision, COMPETITION POLY NEWSL., Oct. 2001. at 5. 13. available at http://
europa.eu.it./comm/competition/speeches/index_2001 (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). The deadline
for GE/Honeywell to submit its proposed undertakings was June 14, three months after the
Commission's decision to open further proceedings. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 91 547.
According to the requirements set out in the Merger Regulation and the Commission's Notice
on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation Number 4364/89 and under Community Reg-
ulation Number 447/98, the only way a submission of undertakings can be accepted after its
deadline is if it properly resolves the issues raised and allows the Commission sufficient time to
evaluate the undertakings, and to consult the Member States. Id. T1 546-548.
160. Knable & Proyer. supra note 8, at 7.
161. The Commission Prohibits GE's Acquisition of Honeywell, (July 3, 2001), at http://
www.honeywell.com/mediakit/announcement-details.jsp?rowID=137&doclD=3348&catlD=3
(last visited Feb. 18. 2003).
162. Id.
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A. The Commission's Finding That the Merger Would Strengthen
GE's Existing Dominant Position in the Large Commercial
and Regional Jet Engine Markets
The first major divergence in reasoning between the EC and DOJ
was the Commission's finding that GE already maintained a dominant
position in the large commercial and regional jet engine markets. 63
As stated earlier, the EC's concept of a "dominant position" is analo-
gous to that of the U.S. concept of market power. 164 The differing
conclusions resulted not from differing procedures involved in merger
regulation, but from basic doctrinal differences. The Commission
based its reasoning upon GE's current market share. The Commis-
sion, using the methodology from its prior aerospace cases,1 65 calcu-
lated the market share on the basis of the installed base of aircraft in
production and the firm orders to date for aircraft that are currently
manufactured.1 66 On the opposite side of the spectrum, U.S. antitrust
experts and economists focused on examining the competition.1 67 The
result of these opposing doctrines is that the EC is able to find domi-
nance in the market for a firm that aggressively discounts, whereas in
the United States, dominance is only found if the competition cannot
163. Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 102, at 18. In fact, although the merger has since been
abandoned, both GE and Honeywell have appealed the Commission's decision to the Court of
First Instance to challenge its conclusions including the finding that GE already had a dominant
position in the large commercial and regional jet engine markets. Francesco Guerrera, How
"Dominance" Became Europe's Dirt-y Word in Takeovers: GE and Honeywell Lobbied as Best
They Could to Complete Their Deal, But Brussels Commissioner Would Have None of it, FIN.
TIMES (London). Oct. 4, 2001, at 18.
164. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Both assert that a firm is "dominant" or
has "market power" when it can act independently of its competitors and is able to stifle compe-
tition. Kolasky, supra note 18.
165. See de Havilland. 1991 O.J. (C 128). 9 21: Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp.. 1997 O.J.
(C 59). J 28.
166. GE/Honeywell, 200t O.J. (C 46). $f 38. These include all deliveries to date and orders
placed but not yet delivered, and exclude aircraft no longer in production.
167. Patterson & Shapiro. supra note 102. at 20. It is undisputed that the large jet engine
market is a bidding market. Id. The three major players. GE, Rolls Royce. and Pratt & Whitney
engage in a bidding process to win engine orders from airlines or airframe manufacturers. Id. In
evaluating competition in these markets. the fundamental question that is raised is: are the bid-
ding events highly competitive or does one firm dominate? ld. Economists have come up with
some questions to answer this:
(1) Do multiple suppliers typically enter the bidding competition'? (2) Do customers
consider these suppliers capable of offering good alternatives? (3) Have suppliers his-
torically preserved their strengths and capabilities despite setbacks? (4) Is bidding vig-
orous? Are there multiple rounds of bidding in which the bids move significantly? Do
suppliers offer major concessions to win the bidding'? (5) Have multiple suppliers
shown the ability actually to win bids with regularity'? and (6) Are multiple suppliers
positioned technically to remain capable and attractive for upcoming bidding events'?
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offer similar, alternative products, thus allowing the firm to win the
bid without having to compete aggressively. 168
Examining the EC's methodology of focusing on current market
share, it becomes clear why it found GE to have an existing dominant
position. In the large commercial jet aircraft market, GE had over a
52% market share for the installed base of aircraft in production, and
a 65% market share for large commercial jet engines that had been
ordered as of January 2000.169 In the large regional jet aircraft mar-
ket, GE had between 60% and 70% of the market share for the in-
stalled base of aircraft in production, and between 90% and 100% of
the market for firm orders. 170 With such giant market shares in both
jet engine markets, the Commission concluded that a dominant posi-
tion already existed prior to the merger.1 71
General Electric and Honeywell both criticized this market share
approach. Both companies argued that this methodology gave a
"static snapshot" of the current market and failed to take into consid-
eration the past and future markets, thus, illustrating its highly com-
petitive nature. 172 The Commission disagreed, however, and stated
that its reasons for choosing this methodology included the installed
base and order backlog of aircraft was "the best proxy to measure and
to interpret the position of competitors in th[e] industry, ' 173 and that
revenue gained from aircraft no longer in production was negligible
168. Id.
169. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 70. 77. The "installed base of engines" on large
commercial aircraft constitutes all aircraft that are currently in production where the engine has
already been installed. Id. 1 38. The engines that have been ordered constitute all recent orders
by airlines for engines that have yet to be installed on aircraft in current production. Id.
170. Id. [1 84-85.
171. Id. I 83. 87. The Commission explained that in the large commercial aircraft engine
market. GE enjoyed a "strong position." Id. 1 83. However. GE displayed several features of
having a dominant position: a market share far ahead of its competitors, an increase in market
share over the past couple years. its large order backlog gives it a leg up on future market
penetration, and it expects to generate a large amount of revenue from its overall installed base.
and thus will be in a strong position to compete in the future. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46).
83.
172. See id. 91 39: see also United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974).
The Court concluded that market share may not necessarily predict the future strength of the
company. Examining the firm's current market share may be illusory. By using "static law." the
Court takes a snapshot of the two firms' market share. Merging parties argue that this snapshot
is not an accurate picture because it does not indicate the future of the merger. It merely takes a
look at the present state of the merger. Id.
173. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). T 41. This conclusion is based on the role that incum-
bency plays in the future purchasing decisions of the airlines. When airlines decide to expand or
replace its existing fleet, their costs are affected by fleet commonality. Thus, an engine supplier
can expect to increase sales as its incumbency grows and airlines are more familiar with its
products.
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compared to ones in current production. 174 For these reasons, the
Commission decided that the installed base and order backlog of en-
gines on aircraft currently being produced were the "main indicators
for the assessment of future competition in th[e] industry.' '1 75
Notwithstanding the methodology that the Commission employed
to evaluate GE's current market share, the DOJ's disagreement
stemmed from its interpretation. Believing the Commission weighed
the market share derived from firm orders outstanding (65%) more
than the market share in the installed base in its decision, the DOJ
dismissed those numbers as "weakly indicative" of the current com-
petitive conditions in the market. 76 The majority of that market
share stemmed from a single sole-source contract with Boeing for the
737, considered the most popularly selling commercial aircraft ever.' 77
Without this contract, the market shares even out at GE with 44%,
Pratt & Whitney178 with 23%, and Rolls Royce with 27%.179 This
more accurate picture of market shares illustrated a fiercer and more
competitive market.180 This new landscape drastically altered the idea
that GE commands the market.
The DOJ also did not agree with the Commission's assertion that
GE's main competitors, Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce, were no
longer powerful enough to compete effectively with GE. 18' For exam-
ple, the new engine awards given as of November 2001 illustrate that
Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney were doing well against GE, with
GE winning 42% of the new contracts, Pratt & Whitney with 32%,
and Rolls Royce with 27%. 182 These numbers refute the theory that
GE had a dominant position. The relatively evenly-balanced market
shares combined with a highly competitive market for new contracts
tend to make GE's supposed "dominant" position less dominant. 183
Another fundamental problem that the DOJ found with the Com-
mission's decision that the merger would strengthen GE's dominant
174. Id. $ 42. The greatest source of revenue for engine suppliers such as GE comes from
earnings in the aftermarket. Thus, engines placed on aircraft that are no longer in production
will not generate a major source of revenue when it is retired from the fleet.
175. Id. $ 44.
176. See Kolasky, supra note 18.
177. Id.
178. Pratt & Whitney is a major competitor to GE in the large commercial aircraft and large
regional jet markets. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 1$ 15, 21.
179. Kolasky, supra note 18. Rolls Royce is the second major competitor to GE in the large
commercial aircraft and large regional jet markets.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
20031 1.311
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position in both engine markets was that it was based entirely on the
bundling of GE and Honeywell products and services. 184 The Com-
mission felt that the complementary nature of the GE and Honeywell
product offerings would give GE the incentive, as well as the ability,
to engage in bundling the products or "cross-subsidization" between
the two markets.1 5 The bundling could arise in various forms, includ-
ing mixed bundling or pure bundling. 18 6 Mixed bundling entails sell-
ing the complementary products together at a price that, owing to the
discounts that apply across the product range, is lower than the price
charged when they are sold separately. 18 7 The other form, pure bun-
dling, occurs when products are sold only in a bundle and not sepa-
rately. 188 Pure bundling may also include technical bundling, where
the components can only function as part of the bundled system,
which effectively makes the components incompatible with the prod-
ucts from the other suppliers. 18 9
With these bundled products, GE/Honeywell would be able to ag-
gressively discount its prices because it would have the financial abil-
ity to cross-subsidize discounts across the products in the bundle. 190
As a result, its rivals would not be able to compete effectively because
the customers in the market, the airframe manufacturers and airlines,
are considered price-sensitive consumers. 191 Competition could
choose either to drop its prices to compete in the short term at the risk
of losing future revenues for research and development, or not drop
prices and lose market share. 192 However, the Commission never
stated anything beyond mere speculation that these would be the ef-
fects of bundling. Because it never quantified these effects, 93 there is
184. See GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46), 412. Because the merged entity can package
complementary products, engines, and avionics and non-avionics products, the effect will be to
strengthen GE's existing dominance. Id. Rivals will be forced to respond by either cutting
prices or creating joint ventures which would likely raise costs. Id.
185. See id. T 349.
186. Id. J 351.
187. Id.
188. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 351.
189. Id.
190. Id. T 353.
191. Id. The Commission's market investigation found that the market of purchasing jet en-
gines and supply parts are price-sensitive. Id.
192. Id. 354. Either way, the results would lead to marginalization of the company and
eventual exit from the market. The competition can either exit in the short term from loss of
market share, or in the long term from no longer having enough capital to be able to keep up
with research and development for future products. GE/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 46). 354.
193. The Commission stated that although it examined economic analyses of mixed bundling,
it concluded that it did not need to rely on any economic models to conclude that the packaged
deals that GE/Honeywell would offer would foreclose competition in the engine and avionics/
non-avionics markets. Id. 1 352: see also Kolasky, supra note 18.
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no knowledge to what degree GE's and Honeywell's rivals will actu-
ally be harmed. 194
General Electric and Honeywell refuted this conclusion by claiming
that bundling does not, for the most part, exist in this industry, and if
it does exist, it does not create any significant advantages for the inte-
grated firm.' 95 In an industry that is characterized by highly differen-
tiated products, powerful buyers, and individually negotiated
transactions, product bundling does not create an advantage.1 96 Gen-
eral Electric and Honeywell pointed to evidence showing that custom-
ers purchase products based on their individual merits as opposed to a
bundled package. 197 It was also shown that integrated firms that have
broader product lines do not necessarily translate into market power
or dominant positions.' 98
Despite studies illustrating this point, the Commission ignored them
and concluded without any empirical evidence that the bundling
would create advantages for GE/Honeywell at the expense of its rivals
and thus would lead to the exit of the competition from the market.
This conclusion is contradictory to the Commission's previous finding
in the Allied Signal/Honeywell Merger case in 1999, where it stated,
"although packages of non-avionics and avionics have existed, they
nevertheless are rare."' 99 To emphasize the weakness of this argu-
ment, the EC, in later press statements, downplayed the significance
of the effects that mixed bundling had in its decision.200 It claimed
that the GE/Honeywell case was concerned more with the transfer of
GE's financial strength to Honeywell, than with it being a portfolio
effects case. 20' This led William Kolasky, the Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney General of the DOJ Antitrust Division, to comment, "If that is so,
it is hard to understand the finding that the merger would strengthen
GE's-not Honeywell's-dominant position in large jet engines. 20 2
194. Patterson & Shapiro. supra note 102. at 19. (stating -[a]dverse effects on customers
would allegedly arise because the feared discounts would weaken rivals and ultimately lead to
their exit[ ]." without articulating how much harm would actually occur).
195. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). 361. Indeed, prior to this proposed merger. Honey-
well was in a position to offer bundled packages with its engines and component parts, and there
is no evidence that Honeywell engaged in bundling. But see id. T[ 356-397 (discussing the Com-
mission's response to GE's and Honeywell's arguments that bundling is not advantageous in
aerospace markets). See also Barry Nalebuff & Shihua Lu, A Bundle of Trouble-Bundling and
the GE/Honeywell Merger (Oct. 2001) (on file with author).
196. Kolasky, supra note 18.
197. Patterson & Shapiro. supra note 102, at 19.
198. Id.
199. Case IV/M.1601. Allied Signal/Honeywell. 1999 O.J. (C 215). $ 121.
200. Kolasky, supra note 18.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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B. The Commission's Finding That the Merger Created a Dominant
Position for Honeywell in the Avionics and Non-Avionics
Product Market
The second major divergence in reasoning between the EC and
DOJ was the Commission's finding that Honeywell would establish a
dominant position in the market for avionics and non-avionics prod-
ucts. This conclusion sparked major disagreements based on the
Commission's reasoning: that a dominant position would be created
by the "range effects" from the combination of GE and Honeywell
products. 20 3 The Commission felt that Honeywell's current position in
the avionics and non-avionics markets combining with GE's "toolkit
for dominance"-GE Capital and GECAS-would create anticompe-
titive effects. 2°4
This argument raised by the EC strikes everyone, including antitrust
agencies, economists, and academics, as eerily familiar. Indeed, this is
the very same argument that was once raised in the United States by
antitrust agencies and believed by the courts to be valid. Before anti-
trust law experienced its revolution in the 1970s, mostly in part due to
the emergence of the "Chicago School," the antitrust agencies and the
courts were opposed to "conglomerate mergers "-mergers between
companies that were not direct competitors but sold complementary
products-and sought to restrict them with arguments that included
deep pockets, reciprocal dealing, and entrenchment. 20 5 However,
through the Chicago School, the courts and agencies learned that
these arguments did not hold water, and in fact, conglomerate merg-
ers tended never to eliminate the competition.20 6 That the EC would
rely on this theory to block a merger in the twenty-first century effec-
tively throws away years of research and experience.
Focusing on the first of the two "toolkits for dominance," GE Capi-
tal, the Commission stated that Honeywell would benefit from GE
Capital's ability to leverage its financial power to secure its products
on new platforms, thereby denying Honeywell's competition the abil-
ity to place its own products on these platforms.20 7 In addition to this
leveraging advantage, GE Capital would be able to provide Honey-
203. Id.
204. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). J 346. This leads one to believe that the EC would
prevent Honeywell from merging with any major financial institution that has plenty of capital
on hand. It is a logical extension of this decision because the Commission mentions only GE
Capital and GECAS that would affect Honeywell's current position. Kolasky, supra note 18.
205. Kolasky. supra note 18.
206. Id.
207. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46). T 344.
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well with cheaper financing, allowing it to cross-subsidize its different
business segments and thus, be able to effectively force out its ri-
vals. 208 The effects of these advantages are similar to that of the ef-
fects of the bundling of GE and Honeywell products. Short-term loss
of revenues by its rivals will in the long term deprive them of being
able to invest in the future and thus, the companies will be marginal-
ized until they exit the market. 20 9
This argument did not make sense to the DOJ. First, the Commis-
sion relied on the fact that GE has the world's largest market capitali-
zation,2 10 which allows GE to be able to take greater risks as well as
give greater discounts to its customers.21 1 The DOJ views market cap-
italization as completely irrelevant while analyzing proposed merg-
ers.212 To illustrate this point, during the "dot-com" craze of the late
1990s, Microsoft and Cisco Systems both had market caps in excess of
GE.2 1
3
Second, merely because Honeywell would be joining GE and its
ability to generate large amounts of capital, there was no reason to
believe that Honeywell would be able to get capital any more cheaply
than its rivals.2 14 General Electric has several divisions that require
capital, and foregoing one division to give capital to another entails
opportunity costs because that capital is no longer available. 215 With
these opportunity costs in mind, GE is forced to be efficient with its
capital. Thus, Honeywell will not have the advantage of cheaper capi-
tal over its rivals.
Third, even if it can be proven that Honeywell has access to cheaper
capital than its rivals, the DOJ regards this as an efficiency. 216 And if
this is viewed as an efficiency, then the Commission's decision to
block this merger is akin to the Commission blocking a merger be-
208. Id. $1 345.
209. Id. 347.
210. Market capitalization is defined as the share value of the company's public stock multi-
plied by the shares outstanding.
211. Kolasky. supra note 18.
212. Id.
213. Id. According to William Kolasky, it is the first time that he has seen a AAA bond rating
as an "antitrust no-no." Id.
214. Id. This difference in view can be attributed to the United States' vast experience in its
markets and its long-standing belief that markets are self-correcting. Id. This is not the case in
Europe, where they are new to deregulated markets and do not have the necessary experience to
believe that its markets will correct themselves without the need of government intervention.
Kolasky. supra note 18.
215. Id.
216. Id. The DOJ regards cheaper capital the same as any valuable asset. including machinery
and superior management skills. Id.
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cause one of the companies has superior management or better re-
sources that will lead to innovation and ultimately cheaper prices. 217
Finally, the DOJ refutes the Commission's argument that the com-
petition will be forced to exit the market because they will no longer
be able to cover their fixed costs associated with the industry.21 8 The
DOJ compares this argument with the "ruinous competition" argu-
ments of the early cartel cases, where economists at the time felt firms
with high fixed costs could not recover these costs in highly competi-
tive markets, thus causing ruinous competition, which would result in
bankruptcy and destruction of assets. 2 1 9 These arguments did not
hold water in the 1890s in the United States, but they seem to still be
treading water in the EC.2 20
Examining the second tool in the "toolkit of dominance"-
GECAS-the Commission concluded this vertical integration of Hon-
eywell's parts with a significant purchaser of aircraft in GECAS would
lead to creation of a dominant position. 22' By extending its GE-only
policy to include Honeywell products, GECAS will secure Honey-
well's products on new platforms.222 Thus, Honeywell's rivals will be
excluded entirely from these new platforms, ultimately hurting
consumers.
The DOJ is hard-pressed to agree with this assessment by the EC
because the numbers do not support the conclusions. Aircraft
purchases by GECAS are less than ten percent, which is not nearly
enough for what the courts deem necessary to conclude that there are
anticompetitive effects. 223 Lack of market power precludes GECAS
from being able to command market foreclosure of its rivals. In fact,
it was shown that other leasing companies are intentionally purchasing
non-GE engines in order to differentiate themselves. 224
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Kolasky. supra note 18. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n. 166 U.S.
290 (1897).
220. See Trans- Missouri Freight, 166 U.S. at 372-73. "Ruinous competition defense would
force the court to decide what a reasonable rate of profit in a particular industry should be." and
this was not the appropriate role of the courts. Id.
221. GE/Honeywell. 2001 O.J. (C 46), 343.
222. Id. T 344.
223. Kolasky, supra note 18. Typically courts require a market share above 30-35%. See
United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963) (holding that 30% market share was
high enough to be considered undue concentration).
224. Kolasky. supra note 18.
[Vol. 52:12851316
THE FAILED GE/HONEYWELL MERGER
C. Diverging Results Between the DOJ and the Commission
There have been several arguments raised in attempts to reconcile
the diverging results between the two merger regulation authorities.
One argument for the contrary results of the merger that has been
repeatedly dismissed by involved regulatory members on both sides of
the Atlantic is the theory that this case was politicized, meaning that
its conclusion was based on politics between the EC and the United
States and not matters of law and economics.2 25 Neither Mario Monti,
the European Competition Commissioner, nor Charles A. James, the
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division at the DOJ, dis-
cussed this as a possible reason for the failure of both regulatory agen-
cies to come to an agreement. 226 Also rejected early on were
complaints that the EC had no business inserting itself into an all-
American deal, claiming that European protectionism was behind the
decision.227 The Merger Regulations expressly state that the EC has
jurisdiction to analyze any merger that meets the concentration test
and Community dimension tests. 228 The focus is placed on the com-
petitive effects in the EC market and not which country the merging
companies are from.229 Moreover, analyzing a merger between two
foreign firms is not uncommon to the DOJ or FTC. In a recent case
involving two offshore companies in the pharmaceutical field, the
225. Press Release, The European Union On-Line. Commissioner Monti Dismisses Criticism
of GE/Honeywell Merger Review and Rejects Politicisation of the Case (June 18. 2001). at http://
europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). "I deplore attempts to mis-
inform the public and to trigger political intervention. This is entirely out of place in an antitrust
case and has no impact on the Commission whatsoever. This is a matter of law and economics.
not politics." Id.
226. Charles A. James. Reconciling Divergent Enforcement Policies: Where Do We Go From
Here?, Address at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9395.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) [hereinafter James. Rec-
onciling Divergent Policies]. "This is not a trade dispute. No one believes the E.U. opposed the
transaction to favor national interests." Id.: Monti Discusses EU Merger Control, Competition
'olicy After GE/Ilone 'well. 80 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 21. 40 (July 13. 2001)
[hereinafter Monti Discusses Merger Control]. "To present the GE/Honeywell case as a confron-
tation between U.S. and EU companies is wrong . I. .." d.
227. See Monti Discusses Merger Control, supra note 226. Monti stated that the EC. as its
policy, focuses its reviews of mergers and acquisitions on the -market dominance" test, without
regard to the nationality of the companies involved. Id.: see also Thomas B. Leary, A Comment
on Merger Enforcement in the United States and in the European Union, Prepared Remarks
Before the Transatlantic Business Dialogue Principals Meeting (Oct. 11. 2001). at http://
www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/tabdOlOl I1 .htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). The EC was well within
its power to review and, ultimately block, a merger involving two U.S.-based companies. Id.
Nationality does not play a role in merger control laws. Id. In comparison, the United States
has not hesitated to review mergers involving non-U.S.-based companies. but which affect its
economy. Id.
228. See EC Merger Regulation. supra note 48.
229. Id.
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FTC had the power to analyze the proposed merger.230 The language
of the EC's Merger Regulation "Community dimension" threshold is
broad enough to enforce the Merger Regulation in acquisitions be-
tween two non-Community firms "where they each have substantial
operations in the Community, thus triggering Commission review and
potential invalidation of transactions outside the Community. '"231
Thus, the Commission can enforce its Merger Regulation against Eu-
ropean and non-European companies when worldwide and Commu-
nity-wide turnovers exceed the required threshold amounts. 232
The differing conclusions between the two regulators did not result
from an inability to come up with the same facts and analysis, but
stemmed from basic procedural and doctrinal differences. 233 With the
continued attempts to work closely together during the investigation
of the proposed merger, the DOJ and Commission came to the same
results in terms of facts, market division, and product divisions. 234
Where they did diverge was in defining the scope of antitrust enforce-
ment. 235 The DOJ believed that the merger would create better prod-
ucts at lower prices, the very purpose of competition. 236  The
Commission, on the other hand, believed that the merger would cre-
ate an unfair disadvantage to GE's competitors and that the short-
term efficiencies would ultimately lead its rivals to exit from the mar-
ket and was thus anticompetitive.2 37 Focusing on the role of GE Capi-
tal and its leasing program, the Commission feared that through
230. See In re Ciba-Geigy Limited. 123 F.T.C. 842 (1997). The FTC reviewed a merger be-
tween two Swiss pharmaceutical firms that would have had effects in the United States market.
Other case examples where the FTC regulated mergers between foreign firms include Glaxol
Wellcome (In re Glaxo/Wellcome, FTC, file no. 951-0054 (Sept. 6, 1996), at http://busi-
ness.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll) and Glaxo Wellcome/Smith Kline Beecham (In re Glaxo
Wellcome plc./SmithKline Beecham plc., FTC, file no. 001-0088 (Jan. 26, 2001), at http://busi-
ness.cch.com/primesrc/bin/highwire.dll).
231. Waller, supra note 15, at 74: see also James S. Venit, European Merger Control, the First
Twelve Months, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 981, 981-85 (1991).
232. Jones-Starr, supra note 52, at 153.
233. Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the Bush Administration, Address Before
the Canadian Bar Association, Annual Fall Conference on Competition Law (Sept. 21. 2001). at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9100.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
234. See Muris, supra note 92 (stating that GE/Honeywell was the only case where the EC and
the United States disagreed after examining the same facts in the same market context and the
merger was prohibited).
235. James, supra note 233.
236. Id.
237. Id.: see also Eleanor M. Fox. Antitrust and Competitiveness: Efficiencies. Failing Firms.
and the World Arena. Global and Innovation-Based Competition Hearings Before the F.T.C.
(Dec. 13, 1994), at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/global/fox.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). "EC law is
much more concerned than U.S. law with protecting smaller firms against abuses of dominance,
merger and other decisions are much more subject to politics and (therefore) national industrial
policies." Id.
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providing targeted financial solutions, it would be able to leverage its
financial strength to market its own products. 238 This would have put
the competition at a major disadvantage, and most likely would have
caused it to fail.239
This fundamental difference can be attributed to the EC's emphasis
on long-term harm over short-term efficiencies when analyzing these
kinds of mergers. 240 United States antitrust thinkers do not attempt to
guess at the long-term effects and presume that the market will find a
way to fix itself, be it through competing mergers or a shift in strat-
egy.241 Perhaps this is because the United States has faith in its mar-
kets, whereas the EC is still trying to break from its history of
government regulations and is not willing to depend on the markets as
much.
24 2
Another fundamental difference between the two systems involves
the procedural framework within which each operates. In the United
States, neither the DOJ nor FTC has the power to block a deal. 243 In
order for the government to challenge the proposed merger, it must
take the merging corporations to court.244 This is not the case in the
EC. Unlike the DOJ and FTC, which act in a law enforcement capac-
ity, the EC is seen as the "investigator, prosecutor, judge, [and]
jury. '245 Thus, it does not have to face an independent court to argue
that a merger will create anticompetitive effects in the market. The
EC is also the final defense to a proposed merger; once it allows the
merger to take place, it cannot challenge it in the court of first in-
stance.246 This fundamental difference radically alters the EC's
238. Martin Sikora, Why All Buvers Should Care About the GE/Honeywell Misfire: The Mes-
sage in the EC's Rejection of the Aerospace Megadeal is that Europeans Have the Muscle to Make
or Break Mergers with Global Dimensions, MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONS: DEALMAKERS J. 2001.
WL 9054640 (Sept. 1. 2001).
239. Id.
240. Press Release. F.T.C.. FTC Chairman Muris Stresses Commitment to Cooperation With
European Commission (Nov. 14. 2001). at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/11/euus.htm (last visited
Jan. 30. 2003) (stating that "in contrast to the U.S. approach. the EC appears to have emphasized
the possibility of long-term harm over the near-term efficiencies and consumer benefits that the
transaction likely would have produced").
241. Kolasky, supra note 18.
242. Id.: see also Sikora, supra note 238 (commenting that the EC was concerned that, al-
though no competition in the aerospace market was failing, if it cleared the GE/Honeywell
merger. the competition would have failed, unlike the United States that allows the market to
decide their fate).
243. Guerrera & Ratner. supra note 6, at 3.
244. Id. "[The Commission has to ensure that the competitive structure on the relevant mar-
kets is not harmed as a result of the merger." Id.
245. Kolasky, supra note 18.
246. See Guerrera & Ratner, supra note 6. at 3. See also Dominick Lasok & K.P.E. LASOK.
LAw & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 324 (2001). The Court of First Instance. similar
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merger regulations as compared to the United States. With the ability
to challenge the merger in court, the United States has the latitude to
clear a merger that is borderline in having anticompetitive effects. If
the merger ultimately creates anticompetitive effects, it can then rem-
edy the situation in federal court.247 However, the EC does not have
this buffer zone. Because it is the final defense to blocking a merger
that has possible anticompetitive effects, it must make certain to do its
homework thoroughly. 248
This procedural divergence alters merger regulations between the
two agencies another way by changing the role of fact-finder. The
DOJ and FTC know that they must take the companies to court to
block a merger. By taking the merger to court, the court plays the
role of fact-finder, and the antitrust agency must prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the merger will substantially lessen com-
petition. 249 Having to present a case to an independent fact-finder
forces the agency to bring only those cases that it truly feels create
anticompetitive effects. 250 Thus, a separation between the investiga-
tors and judge creates a strong checks and balances system in the
merger control process. 251  By contrast, in the EU, the Commission
does not have such tight judicial oversight. Not only does it play the
role of the merger regulation enforcer, but it also has the role of fact-
finder. Because it plays the role of "investigator, prosecutor, judge,
and jury, '' 252 there is no effective system of checks and balances to
ensure that the EC is making final decisions on merger cases that will
survive judicial scrutiny.25 3 Thus, under these differing procedural
to U.S. lower federal courts, hears and determines cases at first instance, and is subject to appeal
to the Court of Justice. Id. The Court's jurisdiction includes all actions brought by natural or
legal persons. including competition cases. Id. at 325.
247. Alexander Schaub. The Direction of Competition Policy: Reconciling National and Inter-
national Objectives. Address Before the Annual Fall Conference on Competition Law (Sept. 21.
2001), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp200l033-en.pdf (last visited
Jan. 30. 2003).
248. Id.
249. Kolasky, supra note 18.
250. See id. (stating that proving a case to an independent fact-finder disciplines an agency's
decision-making).
251. Id. Knowing that one will have to prove one's case to an independent fact-finder forces
one to bring only one's strongest cases and most persuasive arguments. ld. The cross-examina-
tion mechanism alone creates a threshold which makes the burden of persuasion all that more
difficult to overcome. Id.
252. Id.
253. See generally Kolasky. supra note 18 (pointing out that the EC procedure makes the final
decision on merger cases, and that the judicial review that does exist is slow and highly deferen-
tial to the Commission's factual conclusions). But see Monti Discusses Merger Control. supra
note 226. at 40. Monti argues that there is effective judicial oversight of the Commission's
merger control decisions. Id. Of the mergers that have been prohibited, which is less than one
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frameworks, there are possible divergences between the two agencies,
not only as a result of differing abilities to redress mergers that will
create anticompetitive effects, but also because one agency has more
of a law enforcement role, whereas the other has more of a regulatory
role.
Another difference, and possibly the most problematic one, is the
fundamental disagreement about the so-called "portfolio-effects" the-
ory. The portfolio-effects theory, or range-effects theory, states that a
merger should be blocked if it creates a stronger competitor that will
ultimately foreclose competition in the market because the new com-
pany will reduce prices and raise output, driving everyone out of the
market. 254 This theory once had a major stranglehold in U.S. antitrust
theory until the antitrust revolution of the 1970s.2 55 Since then, it has
been criticized by U.S. scholars and antitrust experts as "anti-con-
sumer" and is no longer subscribed to in the United States.25 6 How-
ever, it seems, as this case highlights, that the theory is still alive and
well across the Atlantic. In GE/Honeywell, the Commission believed
that with the merging of the companies, the efficiencies created would
allow GE to gain a stranglehold on the market to supply large com-
mercial and regional jet aircraft engines ultimately forcing disinvest-
ment and exit of the competition in the market.2 57 The EC wanted to
protect the competition from such short-term efficiencies to keep the
percent of all mergers scrutinized, over forty percent of them have been examined by the courts
on review. Id. This amount of judicial scrutiny "is largely sufficient to ensure that the commis-
sion takes jurisdictional control seriously and that it does not prohibit a merger without being
very convinced that its decision would stand a legal challenge." Id.
254. Kolasky, supra note 18. See also Peter Spiegel & Francesco Guerrera, EU Defends Legal
Case on Takeovers, FIN. TIMES (London). Oct. 16. 2001. at 16. "The so-called 'portfolio effect'
theories ... hold that the wide range of offerings in a merged conglomerate can unfairly give the
new company an ability to leverage a dominant position in one industry to gain market share in
another . I..." d.
255. See Leary, supra note 227: see also Deborah Plait Majoras. GE-Honeywell: The U.S.
Decision. Address Before the Antitrust Law Section State Bar of Georgia (Nov. 29, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.htm (last visited Jan. 30. 2003). During the 1960s
and 1970s where the United States experienced a wave of conglomerate mergers, the courts used
the entrenchment doctrine to condemn mergers that "strengthened an already dominant firm
through greater efficiencies or gave the acquired firm access to a broader line of products or
greater financial resources, thereby making life harder for smaller rivals." Id. The entrenchment
doctrine was later eliminated in 1982 as a basis for challenging non-horizontal mergers by the
DOJ's Merger Guidelines and the FTC's Statement on Horizontal Mergers. Id. It was elimi-
nated because the agencies realized that efficiency and competition created lower prices, and
that these benefits outweighed the harm to competition. Id.
256. Spiegel & Guerrera, supra note 254. at 16.
257. GE/Honevwell. 2001 O.J. (C 46), 9$ 427, 434.
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market competitive in the long run.258 However, antitrust scholars in
the United States feel that this theory goes against the central tenet of
antitrust policy.259 As quoted in the Supreme Court case Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan:260
The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from
the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure
of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is
competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly
tends to destroy competition itself .... 261
The EC is protecting competitors in the short term to prevent foreclo-
sure of the market by a dominant firm in the future. However, U.S.
antitrust policy argues that competition is not the ends, but the means,
to get to a different end, market efficiency.
Therefore, the DOJ agreed to the merger for the very same reason
that the Commission blocked it. The EC's concern that Honeywell's
access to GE's financial arms in GE Capital and GECAS will create a
dominant position in the market of supplying corporate jet engines as
well as avionics and non-avionics parts is not a concern at all for its
U.S. counterparts.
V. IMPACT
The major lessons for American companies to take away from the
Commission's decision in GE/Honeywell are that not only is the EC
examining proposed mergers with greater scrutiny, but also that
merger regulation is now becoming very unpredictable. One major
effect resulting from the failure of the GE/Honeywell merger was the
realization that the EC is increasingly asserting its merger regulation
laws.262 By blocking this merger, the "EC underscored the reality that
combining firms of size inevitably must serve antitrust masters both in
the U.S. and abroad and left companies groping for ways to navigate
the dual regulatory tracks. '' 263 It signaled the end for companies be-
lieving that they need to focus only on the U.S. antitrust agencies
when attempting to merge. Prohibiting the GE/Honeywell merger
not only showed that mergers are being reviewed more and more by
multiple jurisdictions, but also that the EC is no longer secondary to
258. Id. $$ 427, 423, 442. Not being able to compete against the efficiencies created by the
newly merged company, rivals would have to decide if they can remain competitive in the future
with diminishing investment dollars. Id.
259. Kolasky, supra note 18.
260. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
261. McQuillan, 506 U.S. at 458.
262. Sikora, supra note 238.
263. Id.
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the U.S. antitrust agencies. 264 Indeed, the number of investigations
opened by the EC on proposed mergers increased by nearly a third in
the past five years.265 In addition, Monti, who was named the Euro-
pean Competition Commissioner in 1999, has a reputation as a tough
enforcer. 266 He has lived up to this reputation by blocking eight deals
in two years, as compared to the eighteen that the EC has blocked in
its history.267
Notwithstanding the sudden emergence of the EC as a major player
in the merger regulations, few experts believe that this event will re-
sult in a chilling effect where companies will not merge for fear that it
will be blocked by the EC.268 Instead, they feel the result of the failed
GE/Honeywell merger will cause companies to change their attitudes
toward merger regulation. 269
Despite the fact that this decision by the EC was the first time that
there was a disagreement with a U.S. antitrust agency regarding an all-
American company merger, some argue that the effects will be mini-
mal. 270 There have been major coordination efforts between the
United States and EC for the past ten years, starting with the bilateral
agreement between the two in 1992.271 Over these past ten years,
there has been a significant amount of convergence between the two
countries' antitrust agencies. According to Commissioner Monti, dur-
ing those years the EC developed a "very constructive cooperation
with the U.S. Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission,
264. Id.
265. See Guerrera & Ratner. supra note 6. at 3 (discussing a recent study that contends that
the mergers subject to full-scale investigations by the Commission has risen by nearly a third in
the past five years): see also Schaub, supra note 247, at 7 (commenting that the number of merg-
ers reviewed in 2000 were up eighteen percent from the year before, and during the first couple
of months in 2001, it appears that even more will be reviewed this year).
266. Guerrera & de Jonquieres, supra note 5. at 16.
267. Id.
268. See Guerrera & Ratner. supra note 6. at 3.
269. Id.
270. See generally Muris. supra note 92 (stating that based on the past ten years of bilateral
cooperation between the EU and the United States along with similar competition policies. GE/
Honeywell-type outcomes are the exception and not the norm): Leary, supra note 227 (stating
that putting the GE/Honeywell case in context, the antitrust authorities in the United States and
in the EU are a lot closer than the public believes them to be. and will only get closer): Commis-
sion Bars Acquisition, supra note 1. at 14 (indicating that Commissioner Monti stated that the
GE/Honeywell case presented a rare case where the two agencies disagreed).
271. See Karel Van Miert. Globalization of Competition: The Need for Global Governance,
Speech Before Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Mar. 25, 1998), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competi-
tion/speeches/text/sp1998 052 en.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2003) (discussing the United States/
EU agreement of 1991): see also Schaub. supra note 247. The EC's experience with its bilateral
agreement with the United States is that it has been very effective, especially in merger cases
where it helped reduce the risk of divergent outcomes. Id.
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especially on mergers that require regulatory clearance on both
sides. '272 However, despite this extraordinary effort to ensure consis-
tent results on both sides, there will be cases where there will be disa-
greement between the two sides.273 This case was merely the first
time that the two agencies could not come to an agreement. It is ar-
gued that this prohibited merger was an anomaly that cannotbe fixed
with greater convergence; that it is just the nature of having two dif-
ferent jurisdictions examining the same merger.274
Even though it may be that blocking the GE/Honeywell merger is
considered a rare occurrence, nevertheless, it gives pause to a firm
that relies on the U.S. belief that conglomerate mergers create no
provable anticompetitive effects.275  At the very minimum, it defi-
nitely sends notice to international companies that deal heavily in Eu-
ropean markets that the EC must be taken seriously or the company
will face the consequences, the worst being similar to GE's and Hon-
eywell's fate, a blocked merger. This creates a lot of uneasiness and a
possible chilling effect on chief executive officers and investment
bankers for fear that conglomerate mergers are now less predictable
and involve bigger risks.27 6
This case has also created fears in U.S. companies of unpredictabil-
ity in gaining EC regulatory approval, and in turn has forced compa-
nies to increase their efforts to obtain such regulatory approval. 277 As
a result of the EC clearly applying a different theory than the DOJ,
272. Monti Discusses Merger Control, supra note 226. at 40.
273. See Muris, supra note 92. To illustrate the fact that different judgments will occur even
when applying an identical legal standard to the same facts, Muris uses an example of a baseball
game with two umpires standing at a base, each of whom has the ability to call the runner "out."
Id. Even though both umpires know the rules of the game, each umpire will call it as he sees it.
Id. The majority of the calls will be the same, but for close plays, there can be differing calls. Id.:
see also Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Corp.. 1997 O.J. (C 59) (the DOJ and the EC disagreed as
to what role MDC would play in the market, and this disagreement nearly resulted in one agency
blocking the merger and the other one clearing it).
274. See Commission Bars Acquisition, supra note 1, at 14. Commissioner Monti stated that
this case presented "'a rare case where the transatlantic competition authorities have disagreed."
Id.
275. See Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 102, at 23. There is no proof that predicts that
conglomerate mergers will reduce competition or harm consumers. Id.
There are two themes ... on conglomerate mergers: (1) many of them work badly for
the merging parties and are later unwound: and (2) they work best when they involve
products that are complements in the same industry, rather than unrelated products, in
which case established economic theory ...predicts that some price reductions can
arise from the merger.
Id. at 26 n.18.
276. Guerrera & Ratner. supra note 6, at 3.
277. Paul T. Schnell, M & A Highlights in the First Half of 2001. M & A LAWYER, Julv/Aug.,
2001, at 1.
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"[t]he extent that there had been some predictability in terms of what
regulators look to in deciding whether or not to challenge a deal, the
GE/Honeywell case kind of throws in a curve ball. ' 278 This growing
fear of unpredictability is rooted in the EC's application of the portfo-
lio-effects theory to merger regulation, as well as its desire to block
conglomerate mergers that it feels will make the market leader a
stronger competitor and thus ultimately force its competition to exit
the market.279
The EC's application of the portfolio-effects theory is not restricted
to this case. The EC has seen this issue in recent cases including Boe-
ing/Hughes,2s°  Guinness/Grand Metropolitan,28 and Tetra Lavail
Sidel.2 2 Thus, it appears that the EC not only applies this theory, but
also uses it with great frequency. The problem with the EC's belief in
the anticompetitive effects of conglomerate mergers through "portfo-
lio effects" is that it creates a situation where what may be considered
in U.S. antitrust merger regulation as procompetitive will be seen as
anticompetitive in the EC.283 When one jurisdiction is analyzing it as
procompetitive and another jurisdiction sees it as anticompetitive, the
result, according to one antitrust lawyer is "[y]ou have to be aware
that the very argument that gets you off the hook in one jurisdiction
may put you on the hook in another. ' 28 4 According to James, the
Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust Division at the DOJ, the
failure to correct these diverging theories could have harmful effects
on future mergers.285 One expert argues that a possible result of the
prohibited GE/Honeywell merger is that some potential mergers
"might die on the vine" if the EC demands several undertakings. 28 6
After GE/Honeywell, it will be highly speculative to determine what
divestments will be required. 28 7
278. Sikora, supra note 238.
279. James. Reconciling Divergent Policies. supra note 226. Divergence "between the world's
antitrust regimes on an issue this fundamental could undermine the growing consensus favoring
competition over regulation." Id.
280. See Case COMP/M.1879. Boeing/Hughes. 2000 O.J. (C 123). available at http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1879_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 30. 2003).
281. Case IV/M.938. Guinness/Grand Metropolitan, 1997 O.J. (C 156).
282. See Case COMP/M.2416, Tetra Laval/Sidel. 2001 O.J. (C 156) (unpublished opinion),
available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/0l/1516
0 1AGED&lg=EN&display= (last visited Mar. 8, 2003).
283. See supra notes 121-261 and accompanying text.
284. Sikora, supra note 238.
285. Peter Spiegel. US Calls for More Antitrust Agreement with Europe, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 26. 2001, at 11. "The potential economic consequences of antitrust law meaning one thing
in one jurisdiction and something extremely different in another are enormous." Id.
286. Sikora. supra note 238.
287. Id.
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It is clear that there is a need for reaching consistent outcomes.
Apart from the increased costs that would result from diverging out-
comes because of the necessity to deal with each agency on its own,
diverging outcomes would also have the effect of "undermining the
public's confidence in the work [antitrust agencies] do, and risk
politicizing antitrust" to the detriment of creating the feeling of pre-
dictable antitrust enforcement. 28
It is highly unlikely that a policy disagreement of this nature be-
tween two nations can be adequately resolved directly.2 9 This was
not a failure of communication between the two agencies during the
investigative process, or even a failure of agreeing on the facts. What
needs to be remedied in light of this recent event are the diverging
views on certain substantive policies, including the validity of the port-
folio-effects theory.290
These disagreements can be corrected through increased bilateral
cooperation between the United States and EU.291 However, both
sides have emphasized the amount of discussions between the two,
and discount the theory that the diverging conclusions were the result
of lack of communication during the merger investigation process or
understanding between the two.292 The focus, thus, should not be on
the desire for increased communication, but should be more on the
education of theories.293 A strong bilateral relationship is not re-
stricted only to communicating on particular cases, but can also result
in substantive convergence. 294
Seeing that the GE/Honeywell merger seems to have been blocked
more for diverging policies than for lack of communication through-
out the investigation, it seems that increased dialogue on how to work
closer is not the optimal solution. The only solution that may work to
avoid another GE/Honeywell collapse is through education and com-
288. James, supra note 233.
289. James. Reconciling Divergent Policies, supra note 226.
290. See Kolasky, supra note 18 (The EU's view of conglomerate mergers is inconsistent with
the U.S. antitrust laws): see also Muris. supra note 92 ("It appears that the EC is more inclined
than the U.S. authorities to give credence to concern over potential long-term harm that could
arise from range effects of a merger.").
291. James. supra note 233: see also Muris, supra note 92 (noting that both antitrust agencies
have stated they were committed to understanding each other's stance on their divergent
conclusions).
292. See James. supra note 233 (noting the "tremendous amount" of discussions among the
DOJ and EC during the GE/Honeywell investigation).
293. James. supra note 233; Muris. supra note 92.
294. Id. An example of substantive convergence through bilateral agreements is that a num-
ber of jurisdictions are following the lead of the United States and are beginning to recognize
that a leniency policy is a very helpful enforcement tool for combating cartel activity successfully.
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munication relating to the portfolio-effects theory and how conglom-
erate mergers' efficiencies outweigh their speculative long-term
competitive harms. One solution that the EC can undertake to edu-
cate itself about the portfolio-effects theory is to hire more econo-
mists. 295  Commissioner Monti did address this fact after GE/
Honeywell when he mentioned that he was seeking to "increase the
economic component of the Commission's work." 296 This seems to be
a legitimate answer to the DOJ's arguments that the theories that the
Commission used in GE/Honeywell were not grounded in any eco-
nomic theory.297 The other is for increased dialogue between the two
agencies regarding portfolio effects and the effects of conglomerate
mergers. 298
There is not much else the two agencies can do to avoid another
GE/Honeywell mess. The major problem was based on the differing
views on conglomerate mergers and whether they create anticompeti-
tive effects. Through education, the two will achieve greater conver-
gence in this area.
There are already signs that greater convergence is taking place as a
result of this case. Most likely due to recent clamor by U.S. authori-
ties, Commissioner Monti has recently offered new proposals to over-
haul the EC's current system for reviewing mergers and
acquisitions.299 The first of two proposals offered by Monti was a
"cooling-off" period that would allow the merging companies the abil-
ity to stop the clock for two weeks to discuss and modify conces-
sions.300 Under the current system, companies have until the end of
the third month of the Commission's four-month inquiry to offer con-
cessions to appease the regulators.301 Companies have complained
that this leaves them little time to alter insufficient concessions and
295. Patterson & Shapiro, supra note 102, at 24. The United States sees adherence to estab-
lished economic principles by both antitrust agencies to achieve substantive convergence. Id. at
23. One argument explaining the failure of convergence was that the EU failed to create a
dialogue with its economists, or even outside economic experts. unlike the DOJ. Id. at 24.
296. Id. at 23.
297. Id. at 19-20. As compared to the "Big is Bad" doctrine, which has largely been discred-
ited, both theories seem to be indistinguishable both condemn large, financially strong firms
who enter markets by merging with major firms in that industry, use their financial strength to
engage in clearly procompetitive activity, and take advantage of economies of scope to meet
their customers' needs. Id. at 20.
298. The United States can relate to the EC's belief in these theories, for it applied these
theories only forty years ago. See Kolasky. supra note 18.
299. Francesco Guerrera & Birgit Jennen. Monti Plans Changes in Merger Rules. FIN. TIMES
(London), Dec. 6. 2001. at 9.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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gives them little room to bargain with the EC.30 2 The second proposal
was to change the current test that the EC applies in merger cases to
one more similar to the U.S. test. The Commission currently applies
the "dominance test," which states, "deals that create or strengthen a
company's dominant position in a market should be prohibited. 30 3
The United States uses the "substantial lessening of competition
test. "304
However, these proposals may not prove to change anything. The
EC's adoption of the "substantial lessening of competition test" does
not address the issues raised in GE/Honeywell because the EC's cur-
rent merger regulation already incorporates a substantial lessening of
competition requirement into its dominance test.305 It prohibits only
those mergers that create or strengthen a dominant position "as a re-
sult of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in
the common market or in a substantial part of it."'306
Therefore, unless the U.S. antitrust regulators and the EC can come
up with an agreement as to the validity of the portfolio-effects theory,
and if the United States can educate the EC to understand the mar-
kets better and to have faith in their ability to self-correct, it seems
that more decisions like GE/Honeywell will occur.30 7 As a result, fu-
ture conglomerate mergers may not bode well despite being given
clearance by a home regulator.
In addition to the need for increased bilateral cooperation between
the United States and EC, there is a need to have increased multilat-
eral cooperation among all of the countries that currently have com-
petition laws. In a time where there is not only an increasing amount
of mergers with transnational characteristics, but also an increasing
amount of countries that are enacting competition laws, the
probability of potential multi-jurisdictional reviews of the same
merger becomes a real dilemma, which raises the concern of possible
diverging results.308 Bilateral efforts at cooperation play a significant
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Kolasky, supra note 18.
306. Id. (citing EC Merger Regulation, supra note 48, at art. 2, 3).
307. Muris, supra note 92. Having two diverging antitrust departments regulating mergers.
the more restrictive regulator will win out and could therefore block mergers that seem procom-
petitive to the other regulator. Id.
308. Mario Monti. International Co-Operation and Technical Assistance: A View From the EU
(July 4, 2001), at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p-auction.gettxt=gt&doc=
SPEECH/0!/328101RAPID&lg=EN (last visited Mar. 8. 2003). Antitrust enforcers are becom-
ing aware of the increasingly international character of competition cases and that they are
clashing with the traditional territorial scope of domestic antitrust rules. Id. They are now being
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role of effective international antitrust enforcement, but in the future
it is essential that they be supplemented by multilateral efforts. 30 9
With over sixty countries that have enacted merger regulation con-
trols, there will be an increasing number of cases where multiple juris-
dictions will be reviewing the same mergers.310 Although the need for
increased multilateral coordination may not have necessarily changed
the result of this case, this event does address the concerns of the in-
creasing possibility of diverging results entailed with multi-jurisdic-
tional reviews. 31
This issue could effectively be dealt with through the newly created
International Competition Network (ICN). 312 The ICN's purpose is
to create a forum to enable countries to convene and discuss pertinent
procedural and substantive issues in competition law. 313 It will be de-
voted entirely to competition law enforcement. 314 The ICN will not
act in a rule-making capacity, but will merely attempt to influence
procedural and substantive convergence in antitrust enforcement. 315
The major advantage to the ICN is that it creates a forum where all
countries interested in antitrust issues will have the opportunity to
meet, discuss, and educate each other on current issues.316
forced to find ways to avoid these jurisdictional barriers. Id.: see also Press Release, F.T.C., In
the Matter of the Boeing Company. (Sept. 27. 2000). available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/
boeing.htm (last visited Jan. 30. 2003): Boeing/Hughes, Case COMP/M.1879: European Commis-
sion Decision, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/
m1879_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 30. 2003): see Tetra Laval/Sidel.
309. James. supra note 233: see also Monti, supra note 308 (quoting a resolution by the Fourth
United Nations Conference) (commenting that "while bilateral competition cooperation efforts
are essential, there is [a] need to promote regional as well as multilateral competition initiatives.
particularly for smaller and developing countries").
310. James, supra note 233.
311. Cf. id. (commenting that the United States/EU bilateral agreement in 1991 was signed
'because it was clear that the growth of European antitrust enforcement, particularly after the
EC Merger Regulation went into effect in 1990. inevitably would mean that [the United States]
would examine many of the same merger transactions and non-merger conduct").
312. See Press Release. F.T.C.. U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International
Competition Network. (Oct. 25. 2001). at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/l0/icn.htm (last visited
Jan. 30. 2003) (discussing the newly formed International Competition Network. the ICN, and its
focused role in dealing with international antitrust disputes). For more information on the newly
created international forum, visit its website at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
313. About the ICN. at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 30, 2003).
314. Id.: see also James, Reconciling Divergent Policies, supra note 226. "It should be all
antitrust, all the time." Id.
315. International Competition Network Website. at http://www.internationalcompetitionnet-
work.org (last visited Jan. 30. 2003).
316. Monti. supra note 308. "'This venue should provide a forum where government officials
... and others can 'exchange ideas and work toward common solutions of competition law and
policy problems."'
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With this newly created forum concentrating solely on competition
issues, the United States and EC will be able to further discuss
problems that resulted in the GE/Honeywell merger. Indeed, James is
resolved on fixing the problem of the portfolio-effects theory with the
EC at the ICN. 317 This forum will help to increase convergence in
procedural and substantive areas of the law, where the problem in this
case arose. 318 Having a forum such as the ICN will enable greater
convergence of substantive competition issues, and in turn avoid di-
vergent results between multi-jurisdictional reviews of future
mergers. 31 9
In addition to the ICN, there was a proposal to create an interna-
tional antitrust agency, possibly under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization (WTO). 320 Heavily advocated by the EC, it would be a
supplement to other international antitrust agencies, such as the ICN
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). 32 1 This idea, however, has been on the table for a long time
and it does not seem to be the answer with which everyone agrees.322
The advantages to having an international antitrust agency under the
WTO are that it features universal membership and that it has a func-
317. Spiegel, supra note 285, at 11.
318. See Monti, supra note 308.
Competition authorities and other participants in the forum should strive to achieve a
maximum of convergence and consensus on fundamental issues such as the substance
and economics of competition policy, the enforcement priorities of competition author-
ities and a common understanding about best approaches or practices in addressing
certain types of concerns or specific types of cases.
Id.
319. Id.
320. See generally O'Toole, supra note 25 (examining the question of whether the WTO is an
adequate forum to resolve international antitrust disputes); Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and
International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1142 (2001) (advocating that the WTO
become the governing forum for international antitrust issues). But see Honorable Christine A.
Varney, The Federal Trade Commission and International Antitrust, Address to the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute (Oct. 17, 1996), at http:/www.ftc.gov/speeches/varney/fcli_96.htm (last
visited Jan. 30. 2003) (arguing that an "international one-stop shop" is not an effective solution
until the participating nations can create substantive convergence with antitrust regulations):
International Competition Policy Advisory Commission to the Attorney General and Assistant
Attorney General for Antitrust, Final Report 201-279 (2000), available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/
icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).
321. Schaub. supra note 247. The Commission, along with the support of all the member
states of the EU, has been the principal advocate of a framework of competition policies under
the WTO. Id. The OECD is an international organization created to help governments address
the economic, social and governance challenges of a globalized economy. For more information
on OECD, visit its website at http://www.oecd.org/EN/home/0,,EN-home-0-nodirectorate-no-no-
no-0.FF.html.
322. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round. 2 J. INT'L ECON.
L. 665 (1999) (discussing that there is a need to have international efforts at cooperation, but is
hesitant to about placing these efforts within the WTO).
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tional dispute resolution mechanism already in place. 323 Having a
functional dispute resolution system, it ensures that all member coun-
tries will honor the agreements or decisions made regarding a dis-
pute.324 It is also helpful to have developing and developed countries
as members because it provides an arena where countries that are
contemplating competition laws or recently enacted them to begin dis-
cussing and focusing on these issues.325
A major concern of creating an international antitrust forum under
the WTO is that an attempt to come up with one set of international
regulations will only create a minimum set of standards, a "lowest
common denominator," effectively watering down the regulations. 326
With the multitude of countries that have active competition laws, a
multilateral agreement on a set of competition principles will only end
up legitimizing the weak and ineffective rules.327
Another major concern with creating an international antitrust
agency within the WTO is the fear of ceding sovereignty. 328 In theory,
creating an international forum to bring international antitrust regula-
tion under a single set of regulations would be ideal. However, an
attempt to bring the multitude of nations that currently have antitrust
or competition law in their books together to agree on a single set of
regulations would be a very difficult task. 329
Another downside to this solution would be that it might not take
care of the problem of diverging conclusions based on doctrinal dis-
agreements. In this case, what led the Commission to oppose the
merger, that the combined firm of GE and Honeywell would be a
more efficient competitor, was the same thing that led the DOJ to
323. Guzman, supra note 320. at 1158.
324. Id.
325. Karel Van Miert. The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider Negotiations.
Address Before Ambassadors to the WTO (Apr. 21, 1998), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/compe-
tition/speeches/text/sp1998 038 en.html (last visited Mar. 8. 2003). Developing countries will
benefit from an international framework of competition rules in two ways. They will be able to
request cooperation to fight anti-competitive business practices as well as asking for technical
assistance on setting up a domestic competition framework. Id. They will also have the benefit
of a transitional period that is designed to meet any problems resulting from their developing
economies. Id.
326. Van Miert, supra note 325. But see Schaub, supra note 247 (arguing that the EU is not
proposing a "harmonisation of substantive competition laws").
327. Van Miert. supra note 325.
328. This problem arose when the EC attempted to create a Community-level merger regula-
tion at the behest of the Member States. See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text.
329. But see Schaub. supra note 247 (stating that the proposal for the WTO agreement is not
with the idea "to establish by stealth a global competition authority which would erode the
sovereignty of national authorities").
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clear it.330 Therefore, if the two major antitrust agencies diverge in
this basic policy, then it only illustrates the difficulty that arises when
all the nations try to agree on a single set of international merger
regulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
With the increasing globalization of markets, mergers are constantly
being reviewed in multiple jurisdictions. Along with this increase
comes the problem of providing consistent results between jurisdic-
tions. The failed GE/Honeywell merger is a good illustration of what
happens when there are diverging results between the United States
and EU.
The major disagreement between the United States and EC re-
garded the belief that conglomerate mergers could create anticompe-
titive effects within the market, mainly as the result of the portfolio-
effects theory. Antitrust thought and policy in the United States has
come to largely discredit portfolio effects because it had been proven
through case studies and economic analyses that these effects almost
never led to a lessening of competition in the market. What the
United States did find was that conglomerate mergers created
procompetitive effects, if any effect at all, where the merger resulted
in lower prices for consumers. The EC, on the other hand, still be-
lieves that conglomerate mergers could strengthen the merged com-
pany allowing it to get a stranglehold on the market and ultimately
force disinvestment and exit of its rivals from the market.
With the number of countries enforcing merger regulations climb-
ing over sixty, GE/Honeywell is an example of when communication
and convergence in policies fail between countries. This case shows
that in order to maintain consistent results between jurisdictions,.
more effort needs to be made on unilateral cooperation between the
United States and EU, as well as multilateral communications with
other nations. The newly created ICN is the first step in creating sub-
stantial convergence in competition laws and policies. It will provide
a forum for seasoned antitrust experts to discuss important topics to
maintain consistent conclusions, and it will provide a forum for devel-
oping countries to begin discussing these issues and learn the optimal
way of integrating them into their economies.
One short-term effect of GE/Honeywell is that companies now must
realize that there are two merger regulations that they must cooperate
with to ensure that the merger will be cleared. The EC, which has had
330. James. Reconciling Divergent Policies, supra note 226.
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its merger regulation for slightly over a decade, is no longer secondary
to the U.S. regulators. The other short-term effect is that there is a
fear of unpredictability in gaining clearance for regulatory approval.
Dealing specifically with conglomerate mergers, there is a possibility
that in the United States, a conglomerate merger will be found to have
procompetitive effects, but it will be the opposite finding in the EU.
However, these effects will not turn into long-term fears if the two
agencies are able to cooperate better and focus on the validity of port-
folio effects. The greater the convergence of substantive competition
issues, the more likely GE/Honeywell will be the exception to the rule.
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